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This is the second of two Court Review issues devoted to judicial decision mak-ing. The prior issue began with the American Judges Association’s 2012 whitepaper on judicial decision making, which reviewed the science of decision
making, some common problems that judges may have in processing information,
and some suggestions about how judges might become more “mindful.” The issue
also contained an article considering the emotions judges deal with in doing their
jobs, along with strategies judges might use to better regulate their emotions. And
the issue included an article about how judges use heuristics (cognitive shortcuts or
rules of thumb), often without conscious thought, and how that may led to errors.
This issue begins with a question that judges face in courtrooms daily: Can we
tell the difference between the truth and a lie? Richard Schauffler, Director of
Research Services at the National Center for State Courts, and Minneapolis Judge
Kevin Burke explore this question from the judge’s
perspective. They review the literature on whether
we can be trained to tell who’s lying (the short
answer is no) and then discuss what judges might
do to perform better. Schauffler and Burke conclude
with three specific suggestions for judges.
Our second article looks at how judges use—and
control—the testimony of expert witnesses. Profes-
sor Andrew Jurs surveyed 118 state-court judges in
Iowa, Nebraska, and North Dakota. He looked at
items such as whether judges asked their own ques-
tions of experts and, if so, on what topics; whether
judges appointed independent experts and, if so, for
what reasons; and what reasons judges might have
for not appointing independent experts. We think you may find it interesting to
compare your experiences in handling experts with those reflected in the survey.
Our final two articles consider problems that arise when evaluating judicial deci-
sion making. Many states have formal judicial-performance evaluation programs,
and concerns have been expressed that these programs may foster racial or gender
bias in their use of opinion surveys on judicial performance. In our third article,
researchers Jennifer Elek and David Rottman discuss ways in which the chance for
bias can be reduced when using surveys about judicial performance. Elek and
Rottman discuss work that has been done to revise surveys used to evaluate Illinois
judges—and the finding that the initial use of the revised surveys has shown no sys-
tematic differences based on a judge’s gender. 
In our final article, professors Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, and Issi Rosen-Zvi
consider differences between the actual performance of judges and what the public—
or the bar—may perceive. In a study of the Israeli Supreme Court, the authors found
that media reports in a small number of cases tend to drive the opinions about each
justice’s performance, while a review of their record in all cases provides a different
picture. The authors suggest that evaluations of judicial performance should cover as
much of the judge’s work as possible.
We hope you’ll enjoy the issue. Our next issue will include our annual review of
the past year’s United States Supreme Court cases.—Steve Leben & Alan Tomkins
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President’s Column
Toni Manning Higginbotham
LAST CALL FOR HAWAII!
Kohala Coast, Hawaii
The Fairmont Orchid
September 22-27
$219 single/double
Don’t miss thechance toattend the
American Judges Asso-
ciation’s 2013 Annual
Educational Conference
on “The Big Island” of
Hawaii.  We are meeting September 22-27 at the
luxurious Fairmont Orchid.  The cut-off date for
reservations is August 30 and the AJA block is
close to full so make your reservations TODAY!
Every year I look forward to the AJA conference,
and this year is no exception. The educational
sessions promise to be of great interest to judges
from all jurisdiction levels, and the conference
provides the perfect opportunity to talk with
judges from across the United States and
Canada about the concerns and problems we all
face.  You may meet someone who already has
dealt with a situation you currently are con-
fronting who can provide valuable insight and
ideas — and also become a friend and contact.
Please take a few minutes to read the conference
brochure (http://goo.gl/SklRK), and then regis-
ter as soon as possible for this great conference.
Toni Manning Higginbotham, President
The authors wish to acknowledge the legal research assistance and
manuscript review of Jordan Bowman, William & Mary College of
Law, Class of 2014; Tove Kooda, University of St. Thomas School of
Law, Class of 2005; and Annie Balghiti, University of Minnesota Law
School, Class of 2013.
Footnotes
1. See http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement
.php.
2. Dick Cavett, Liar, Liar, Pants Aflame, NY TIMES OPINIONATOR, May
2, 2008, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/liar-
liar-pants-aflame/.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313-314 (1998).
5. Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences (BBCSS)
and Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT), THE POLYGRAPH
AND LIE DETECTION 212 (2003).
Although most of the time people tell the truth, peopledo lie. On a bad day, those working in the justice sys-tem get lied to all day long. Some days the lies are
harmless, even unnecessary, and they amuse and entertain.
Some of the lies are a product of self-deception: “I can quit
doing drugs any time I want.” Some statements are not lies but
honest mistakes: “I’m sure that is the guy who robbed me.” But
on other days the lies are despicable and dangerous, and they
must be exposed. 
The question is: Can we tell the difference between the
truth and the lie? Many of us would like to believe we can rely
on our professional and personal instincts to guide us, or per-
haps even on some professional training we have received.
Often we rely on a process we cannot precisely describe, but
one in which we have confidence nonetheless. We just know.
Or do we?
There have been over 300 post-conviction DNA exonera-
tions in the United States. These cases are dramatic proof that
the ability of judges to determine the truth remains suspect.
Eighteen people had been sentenced to death before DNA
proved their innocence and led to their release. The average
sentence served by DNA exonerees before their release is about
13 years.1 Exonerations have been won in 35 states and Wash-
ington, D.C. And in every case in which DNA led to exonera-
tion, the courts were wrong in determining who was lying. The
cost of that mistake could have killed someone and is a stark
reminder of just how weak we are in determining who is lying.
Although it would be nice to have DNA to answer whether
someone stopped at a stop sign or did a California roll through
it, traffic cases will never be susceptible to DNA analysis. The
admonition “you always believe the police officer” may work
for a few judges or, more likely, may get a laugh among judges
at a cocktail party, but the fact remains that every day courts
make determinations about credibility and rarely is there seri-
ous discussion about how that happens or how to improve the
odds of getting it right. 
A MACHINE CAPABLE OF LIE DETECTION?
In the 1950s, one of the most popular new developments in
applying science to matters of justice was the polygraph,
known by many as the “lie detector.” The device was thought
to determine conclusively if a person was lying by measuring
several physiological indicators such as pulse, blood pressure,
galvanic skin response, and respiration. By having the subject
answer baseline questions and comparing measurements on
these indicators to measurements taken during responses to
questions related to a crime, investigators believed they were
able to accurately determine whether a person (e.g., a suspect
or prospective employee) was telling the truth or not.
Television talk-show host Dick Cavett once had F. Lee Bai-
ley on his show to demonstrate how the polygraph worked.2
Bailey was a strong proponent of the polygraph. Cavett asked
Bailey, “‘If lie detectors work, how come they’re not allowed in
court cases?’” Bailey responded, “‘They do work . . . . I use
them all the time.’” Cavett challenged Bailey to prove it. A few
weeks later, Bailey brought a state-of-the-art polygraph to the
show, complete with a qualified operator of the machine.
Cavett was questioned, and at the end of the questioning, the
polygraph examiner scanned the results. The examiner was to
his field what Henry Kissinger is to the field of foreign affairs:
an expert with a very pronounced German accent. According
to Cavett, the examiner began to noticeably sweat. The exam-
iner said to Bailey, “‘It didn’t vork.’” There, on national televi-
sion, the lie detector could not provide a definitive answer as
to whether a person had lied.3
In United States v. Scheffer, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that juries could be excessively swayed by the testimony
of polygraph experts. The opinion states: 
Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about fac-
tual matters outside the jurors’ knowledge, such as the
analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a
crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury
only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about
whether the witness was telling the truth. Jurisdictions,
in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be
concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive
weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they
are in scientific expertise and at times offering, as in
respondent’s case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue
in the trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately deter-
mine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph
evidence can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess
credibility and guilt.4
In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that
the evidence to support the reliability of the polygraph was
“unreliable, unscientific and biased.”5 But despite being dis-
Who Are You Going to Believe?
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credited, the polygraph remains in widespread use by law
enforcement and prosecutors. Polarization of views on this
issue is reflected in the fact that 31 states bar the admission of
polygraph evidence per se.6 Eighteen states admit polygraph
results at trial if the parties stipulate
to its use before the administration of
the test.7 Only New Mexico allows
for the routine admission of poly-
graph evidence.8 The admissibility of
polygraph results in Federal Court
varies by circuit.9
Because just about every private
company uses a computer, the mail,
or a telephone system to send mes-
sages to someone in another state, the
federal Employee Polygraph Protec-
tion Act of 1988 has a broad applica-
tion.10 This Act prohibits nearly all
use of lie detectors in connection with
employment. It is illegal for all busi-
nesses covered by the Act to require or
even suggest that any employee or job
applicant submit to a lie-detector test.
If a business dismisses, disciplines,
discriminates against, or threatens to
take action against any employee or
job applicant who refuses to take a lie-
detector test, there are sanctions and
civil liability for the business. 
The latest version of the lie-detector machine is the fMRI, or
functional magnetic resonance imaging, developed in the
1990s. The fMRI is similar to the original polygraph machine:
the telling of a lie creates a measureable physiological
response, in this case increased blood oxygenation and blood
flow to the prefrontal and parietal regions of the brain. Images
can be created that show this brain activity. This work was
highlighted at a recent judicial seminar hosted by the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement
of Science and summarized in the
National Judicial College publication
Case in Point.11 Edward Lempinen
described the claims of the vendor
selling this “science” at the seminar
and recounted the critique of a uni-
versity neuroscientist who noted
among other concerns that the defin-
ition of when the brain is “activated”
is arbitrary. The vendor candidly
admitted that “‘[t]here will be mis-
takes. We will misclassify people.’”
But he went on to say that this was
not a big problem, since “‘[t]he judi-
cial system puts people away based
on ambiguous evidence all the time.’”
The next generation of lie-detector
machine is being developed by Cus-
toms and Border Protection, with
additional funding from the military.
This machine combines a micro-
phone to record the person’s voice, a
near-infrared camera to record pupil
dilation and glance location, and a high-definition video cam-
era to record body movements; in addition to recording
responses, the kiosk also functions as the interrogator asking
the questions. This machine is being field tested at the United
States-Mexico border, although budget reductions have slowed
6. See Van Meter v. State, 743 P.2d 385, 387-88 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 355, 358 (Colo. 1981);
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 758-59 (Conn. 1997); State v.
Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 109 (Haw. 1980); People v. Gard, 632
N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ill. 1994); Morton v. Commonwealth, 817
S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1991); Evans v. DeRidder Municipal Fire,
815 So. 2d 61, 67 (La. 2002); Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547
N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989); State v. Hawkins, 604 A.2d 489, 492
(Md. 1992); State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5, 8 (Me. 1989); People v.
Lagrou, No. 207,166, 1999 WL 33434265, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Oct. 22, 1999); Ledin v. State, No. C7-97-876, 1997 WL 757156,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1997); Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824,
836 (Miss. 1995); State v. Burch, 939 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); State v. Staat, 811 P.2d 1261, 1261 (Mont. 1991); State
v. Allen, 560 N.W.2d 829, 842 (Neb. 1997); State v. Ober, 493
A.2d 493, 493 (N.H. 1985); People v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700
(N.Y. 1969); State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351, 360-61 (N.C. 1983);
Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State
v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 231-33 (Or. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Brockington, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. 1983); State v. Werner, 851
A.2d 1093, 1104 (R.I. 2004); State v. Wright, 471 S.E.2d 700, 701-
02 (S.C. 1996); State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588 (S.D. 1985);
State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995); Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280, 293 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987); State v. Hamlin, 499 A.2d 45, 53-54 (Vt. 1985); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 36, 36-38 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); State
v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va. 1979); State v. Dean, 307
N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981).
7. See Cal. Evid. Code §351.1(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 11 of
2012 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/5/2012 ballot); Ex
parte Clements, 447 So.2d 695, 697-98 (Ala. 1984); State v. Mar-
quez, 558 P.2d 692, 696 (Ariz. 1976); Wingfield v. State, 796
S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ark. 1990); Melvin v. State, 606 A.2d 69, 71
(Del. 1992); Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 1975); Fore-
hand v. State, 477 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1996); State v. Fain, 774
P.2d 252, 256 (Idaho 1989); Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308
(Ind. 1996); State v. Losee, 354 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1984);
State v. Wakefield, 977 P.2d 941, 954 (Kan. 1999); State v.
Baskerville, 374 A.2d 441, 442 (N.J. 1977); Kazalyn v. State, 825
P.2d 578, 582 (Nev. 1992); Bismark v. Berger, 465 N.W.2d 480,
481 (N.D. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Brand, No. C-990548, 2000 WL
299497, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,
642 (Utah 1996); State v. Gregory, 910 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash.
1996); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 731 (Wyo. 1986).
8. State v. Sanders, 117 N.M. 452, 459, 872 P.2d 870 (1994).
9. See 140 A.L.R. Fed. 525 (originally published in 1997).
10. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001.
11. Edward W. Lempinen, Exploring the Impact of Neuroscience on Jus-
tice, CASE IN POINT, Spring 2008, at 22-23, available at
http://www.judges.org/pdf/caseinpoint_spring08.pdf.
There is no particular formula
for evaluating the truthfulness
and accuracy of another person’s
statements or testimony. You
bring to this process all of your 
varied experiences. In life, you
frequently decide the truthfulness 
and accuracy of statements
made to you by other people. 
The same factors used to make
those decisions, should be used 
when evaluating the testimony.
New York State Criminal Jury Instructions 2d, Sample
Preliminary Jury Instructions, at 22, available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/5-
SampleCharges/CJI2d.Preliminary_Instructions.pdf

12. Adam Higginbotham, Deception Is Futile When Big Brother’s Lie
Detector Turns Its Eyes on You, WIRED, Jan. 17, 2013,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/ff-lie-detector/.
13. David Matsumoto et al., Evaluating Truthfulness and Detecting
Deception, LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., June 2011, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-
bulletin/june_2011/school_violence (citing C.F. Bond et al., Lie
Detection Across Cultures, 14 JOURNAL OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR 189-
204 (1990)).
14. Dr. Paul Ekman, http://www.ekmaninternational.com/paul-
ekman-international-plc-home/training-courses/online-
training.aspx.
15. See http://www.deceptionmanagement.com/.
16. Ekman, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 96
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913 (1991).
19. Paul Ekman, Maureen O’Sullivan & Mark G. Frank, A Few Can
Catch a Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 265 (1999).
20. Id. at 264 (reporting that a group of 84 federal judges took part in
one such course). 
21. Sue Russell, Can We Detect When Someone’s Lying?, SALON, Sept.
16, 2012, www.salon.com/2012/09/16/can_we_detect_when_
someones_lying.
its deployment.12 In an attempt to recognize and overcome the
fact that, once again, the machine is simply registering physio-
logical responses that are supposed to prove lying, the inventors
have received funding to study how people might defeat the
ability of the machine to read them. 
In the 1700s, a German doctor believed that the shape and
contours of the human skull could predict a person’s character
and therefore criminality. For many years, some believed this
new “science” of phrenology would revolutionize criminal law,
but today the idea is totally discredited. Similarly, the best sci-
entific evidence today is clear: the polygraph should be tossed
to the junkyard of pseudoscience like phrenology. No one can
predict whether some new machine may be invented. But
today all of the machines are based on a faulty premise that, in
each and every case, telling a lie will provoke a physiological
response in all people. That link is simply not true. Some peo-
ple can lie without any physiological response; indeed Soviet
spies were trained to lie without any physiological response,
and it worked. The problem is not the polygraph machine or
the fMRI or the interrogator kiosk, it is the premise upon
which they are based. While it is understandable that judges
and others want some forensic machine to help, there is sim-
ply no machine that can determine if a witness is lying, or con-
versely, if a person is telling the truth. All these technologies
generate unacceptably high rates of false positives—that is,
results that suggest truthful people are lying when they are not.
CAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TEACH JUDGES TO DETECT
LIES?
The drive to develop a science of lie detection extends to the
social sciences as well. The earliest versions of the behavioral-
science approach argued that certain eye behaviors, such as
gaze aversion and shifting eyes left or right, could successfully
determine deception. A review of evaluations of this claim
found that “[23] out of 24 peer-reviewed studies published in
scientific journals reporting experiments on eye behavior as an
indicator of lying have rejected this hypothesis. No scientific
evidence exists to suggest that eye behavior or gaze aversion
can gauge truthfulness reliably.”13 And yet there remain the
popular myths that timing and duration of speech are off when
someone is lying. Some claim people touch their nose more
when lying and a great deal less when telling the truth. Others
claim a liar breathes faster, displaying short breaths followed
by one deep breath. And there is the popular myth that the
mouth may appear dry (causing much throat clearing). The
problem with these myths is they just are not true. So placing
a water pitcher in front of a wit-
ness and waiting for signs of dry
mouth will not advance the quest
to find the truth. But it is a nice
thing to do for the witness.
A more recent version of the
behavioral-science approach is
based on the recognition of
microexpressions—brief involun-
tary facial expressions generated
by emotions. This training is pack-
aged and sold online as “products”
with names like “Micro Expression Training Tool” and “Subtle
Expression Training Tool,” with the tag line “Accept No Sub-
stitutes.”14 One website boasts that their “deception expert . . .
teaches scientifically proven methods of lie detecting . . . .
These ‘state of the art’ methods are what federal agents, law
enforcement and other professionals are taught when they seek
the highest accuracy rates.”15
Although not a single study supports the idea that those
taking “training” to detect behavioral cues said to accompany
a lie are better at determining whether a person is lying,
courses continue to be taught to law enforcement, prosecutors,
and judges, enticing them to “[s]ee why Government agencies,
Fortune 500 companies, educational and medical professionals
are using Dr. Ekman’s training to enhance their ability to bet-
ter ‘read’ people and detect truth and lies.”16 Here, the claim to
scientific truth is enhanced by the claim that not only is this
training “scientifically proven and field tested,” it is “now the
basis of a new television show on FOX/SKY tv—Lie to Me—to
which Dr. Paul Ekman is the Scientific Consultant.”17
The same psychologists who publish academic papers in
professional journals admitting that “[i]n every study reported,
people have not been very accurate in judging when someone
is lying”18 and “[i]t is unlikely that judging deception from
demeanor will ever be sufficiently accurate to be admissible in
the courtroom”19 also serve as faculty to state and local judges
for the courses designed to convince them of the opposite—
namely, that they can be taught to accurately detect lies.20 There
is nothing wrong with exploring what we know and don’t know
about something as central to justice as the ability to determine
what is a lie, but the danger such courses potentially create is
that they convince the students they have achieved expertise.
This “expert effect” results in its opposite: “‘you become less,
not more, effective than the average person, likely because of
overconfidence or overblown belief in yourself.’”21
[T]here is simply
no machine that
can determine 
if a witness is
lying, or 
conversely, if 
a person is
telling the truth.
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22. Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: The Lie,
the Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 327-337
(2011).
23. Saskia van Bergen et al., Memory Distrust and Acceptance of Misin-
formation, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 885-896 (2010).
24. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (quoting E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 1972)).
25. See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985); State v.
Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994). In 2003, Illinois became
the first state to require by law that all police interrogations of sus-
pects in homicide cases must be recorded. Recording Police Inter-
rogations: Bill Would Expand Beyond Homicide Cases, 101 ILL. B.J.
69 (2013).
26. BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2012).
Studies have shown those who
have taken such courses are more
likely to believe they know when
someone is lying than others and to
cease to adhere to the duty to
examine all the evidence at hand. A
judge who believes he or she is a
lie-detection expert is making deci-
sions based on false criteria invisi-
ble to other actors. Such a judge
does not make explicit that he or
she has made a ruling based on
interpreting the sideward glance or posture of a defendant in
response to a question. Too often the jargon of a written order
is “based on the demeanor of the witness.” By relying on this
“training” the judge succumbs to the danger foreseen by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Scheffer, namely abandoning
the duty to evaluate all the facts, testimony, and evidence before
him or her. Armed with this training, judges, like law enforce-
ment, can succumb to confirmation bias, in which they see and
hear what they want to hear based on the rules of behavior
defined in the training while ignoring facts and behaviors that
exist outside of that framework. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FALSE CONFESSIONS
Perhaps no lie seems as counterintuitive as the false confes-
sion. In about 25% of DNA-exoneration cases, innocent defen-
dants made incriminating statements, made complete confes-
sions, or even pled guilty. If you can’t rely on a confession
being the truth, what can you believe? Most confessions are
genuine, and people plead guilty because they are guilty. But
these cases show that confessions can occasionally be a lie. 
How is it that someone confesses to something he or she did
not do? A study by Saul Kassin and Jennifer Perillo of John Jay
College of Criminal Justice tested how bluffing affects “confes-
sions” gained from innocent parties.22 The subjects of the
study were instructed to complete a task on a computer and
then were falsely accused of crashing the computer or collabo-
rating with a colleague to improve their performance. Bluff evi-
dence, false evidence, and unreliable witnesses were used to
test their effect. In the first test, 60% of the subjects “con-
fessed” to pressing a computer key they had been instructed to
avoid when, in fact, they had not. Research has identified two
sets of risk factors for false confessions: (1) dispositional vul-
nerabilities inherent in the suspect, such as youth, intellectual
impairments, mental illness, and personality traits that foster
compliance and suggestibility; and (2) situational pressures
inherent in the conditions of custody and interrogation, such
as excessive time, the presentation of false incriminating evi-
dence, and the use of minimization themes that imply leniency.
Studies by Dr. Robert Horselenberg of Maastricht University
have similar results to the Kassin and Perillo research. Dr.
Horselenberg and his fellow researchers told 83 people that
they were taking part in a taste test for a supermarket chain.
The top taster would win a prize such as an iPad or a set of
DVDs. The volunteers were asked to try ten cans of fizzy drink
and guess which was which. The labels were obscured by socks
pulled up to the rim of each can, so to cheat a volunteer had
only to lower the sock. The test was filmed by a hidden camera,
which caught ten participants who actually did cheat. Bafflingly,
though, another eight falsely confessed when accused by the
experimenter.23
In Colorado v. Connelly, Justice Brennan’s dissent detailed
the powerful impact a confession has on the outcome of a case.
Justice Brennan wrote: 
Our distrust for reliance on confessions is due, in part,
to their decisive impact upon the adversarial process. Tri-
ers of fact accord confessions such heavy weight in their
determinations that “the introduction of a confession
makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous,
and the real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs when
the confession is obtained.” No other class of evidence is
so profoundly prejudicial. “Thus the decision to confess
before trial amounts in effect to a waiver of the right to
require the state to meet its heavy burden of proof.” 24
False confessions demonstrate the limitations on our ability
to determine what is a lie even where it is so obvious that the
“lie” is against one’s self-interest. There are reforms that have
or can significantly reduce the likelihood that the “confession”
is in fact a lie. Some states in recent years have tried, either
through legislation or court decisions, to ensure the confession
is not a lie.25 Videotaping confessions and changing interroga-
tion methods are the most common reforms and have the
potential to aid in differentiating lies from the truth. University
of Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett, author of the 2011
book Convicting the Innocent, reviewed 250 cases of people
who were exonerated by DNA evidence. Garrett found that
suspects confessed in detail to crimes they didn’t commit in 40
of those cases. None of the interrogations in those cases was
recorded in its entirety. As Garrett noted, when the entire inter-
rogation is recorded, discovering whether interrogators have
provided suspects with key details of the crime is a lot easier.26
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Eyewitness identification that is inaccurate is most likely
not a lie but the product of self-deception or just an honest
mistake. This is what we know about the phenomenon of eye-
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witness identification: mistakes can happen. As with false con-
fessions, we know that reforms in police procedures can
reduce the possibility of a mistake. We know at a minimum
that jury instructions regarding eyewitness testimony can be
improved. 
Law enforcement, lawyers, judges, and psychologists have
worked together to make eyewitness testimony more reliable
and accurate. Although the United States Supreme Court
declined to order new procedures in Perry v. New Hampshire,27
and held that the Due Process Clause does not require a pre-
liminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness
identification when the identification was not procured under
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances, New Jersey and Ore-
gon have introduced significant reforms on their own.28 In the
words of the New Jersey Supreme Court, there is a “troubling
lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications.”29 Could the
same be said of some of our judgments regarding when a
defendant or a witness is lying? And if that is so, should courts
at a minimum rethink what jury instructions should say?
Telling people to use the same factors you use in life sounds
pretty simple; it is just that many of the factors we use are
wrong—or at least challengeable.
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM MINDFULNESS
There is a compelling body of social and cognitive research
on how people make decisions and how the brain processes
information. The caveat here is that there is still much that sci-
entists do not know, but what is known and widely accepted
may improve a judge’s ability to figure out whom to believe.
Anchoring is the well-documented phenomenon that
describes the process through which an individual’s estimates
or comparison judgments are influenced by an initial value;
information provided early in a process shapes subsequent
judgments.30 This can occur with judges just like anyone else.
The problem if a judge anchors on a fact, or even worse, an
irrelevant fact, is that anchoring can blind the judge to other
evidence or an alternative view of what happened. Judgment
about lying can be premature and then distorted by confirma-
tion bias where the decision maker overly focuses on facts sup-
porting the premature decision and ignores facts that are
inconsistent with that view. One study found that criminal-law
judges exposed to a high anchor responded to incriminating
evidence faster than exculpatory evidence (measured by
response latencies on a timed categorization test), suggesting
that the anchor primed the judges to look for anchor-consis-
tent information. The same was not true for exculpatory infor-
mation. The researchers found this consistent with prior
research indicating that nega-
tive information tends to be
more salient for individuals in
general, and they hypothesized
that judges focus on the incrim-
inating information because
they are charged with determin-
ing whether the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.31 In addition, the crimi-
nal-law judges were more cer-
tain about their decisions than those who were not experts in
criminal law, suggesting that “experts may mistakenly see
themselves as less susceptible to biasing influences on their
sentencing decisions.”32
It is plausible that the expertise criminal-law judges had
was a product of egocentricity—overconfidence in one’s abili-
ties. Egocentricity may be the single most important lesson
from mindfulness research. Simply put, overconfidence in
one’s ability may be counterproductive to good decision mak-
ing. While the culture of judicial decision making is weighted
toward rarely expressing self-doubt, good judicial decision
making—in this case, trying to determine the truth—needs to
be heavily weighted toward acknowledging that this is a diffi-
cult task.
Implicit biases can also affect one’s judgment. Implicit
biases are based on attitudes or stereotypes that operate below
the radar.33 As a result, individuals are not aware that implicit
biases may be affecting their behaviors and decisions. Indeed,
research shows that even individuals who consciously strive to
be fair and objective can nonetheless be influenced by implicit
biases.34 The good news is that the researchers found that
“when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own
responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are
motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”35
WHAT IS A JUDGE TO DO?
Forensic science has produced valuable new advances that
have contributed to making the system of justice better. Those
advances, however, also have revealed that sometimes faulty
forensic-science analyses may have contributed to egregious
errors. There are expensive polygraph machines and lie-detec-
tor apps for an iPhone—even iBodyLanguage. These apps are
cheap and entertaining. However, there is no machine that can
accurately detect if the defendant is telling the truth when he
or she either confesses to a horrific crime or claims to have
stopped at a stop sign. But the quest for the truth cannot be
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deterred by a lack of a machine (or an app for your iPhone).
The notion that whether a person is lying or telling the truth
can be detected by a trained expert remains a popular one, but
it is simply not supported by behavioral science. That science
teaches us that behaviors claimed to prove lying are often
merely expressions of stress or anxiety. An honest person, asked
a question in a stressful setting, may fidget, avoid eye contact,
cross his or her arms, or contradict himself or herself, none of
which constitute definitive proof of lying. Conversely, a variety
of instances have been documented in which spies trained
themselves to provide false statements during a polygraph, and
as a result they “beat” the machine and the lie is seen as truth.
Habitual liars may register no behaviors that suggest deception,
since dishonesty is a way of life for them.
Talking about lying might be nothing but fodder for inter-
esting conversation were it not for the profound consequences
of getting this wrong. As clarified in Daniel Kahneman’s award-
winning book Thinking, Fast and Slow, focus requires energy to
sustain slower, deliberative, and rational decision making.36
Judges cannot simply throw up their hands and say, “deter-
mining who is lying cannot be done.” But they can—indeed
must—improve the process of making the decision about what
is a lie. 
Three things can make a judge a better judicial lie detector. 
1. Judges should acknowledge that the human mind can play
tricks on them in determining who is lying. Egocentrism
may be a term of art in psychology that is more easily
understood in the context of courts as “black robe disease.”
If a judge assumes that he or she has unique powers to
determine who is telling the truth either because of “train-
ing” or some inherited talent, there is an increased likeli-
hood of making a mistake.
2. Judges need to use their brains in following the testimony
and evaluating inconsistencies, rather than relying on visual
cues, to try to figure out what is “more probably true than
not true” at trial. Even in this endeavor, though, judicial
humility is really what is called for. Everyone who tells a
story several times may have some inconsistencies in the
retelling of the story, and yet these are not lies. Rather than
jumping on one inconsistency in a witness’s testimony,
judges should think. In the final analysis, that inconsistency
may prove so compelling that a judge should simply not
believe the testimony. But, just as juries are instructed to do,
judges need to do their best to keep an open mind until
they’ve heard—and carefully considered—everything
before them. Judges need to ask: Am I anchoring? Did I
make a premature judgment and ignore conflicting evi-
dence? Was my decision the product of confirmation bias?
Is there a chance my decision about who to believe is a
product of implicit bias?
3. In the final analysis, the burden of proof may well be the
most important safeguard for judges. The standard in crim-
inal cases is a high one (“beyond a reasonable doubt”), but
the standard in civil cases (“more likely”) is no less com-
pelling in its demand. While many cases are clear cut, there
are many others where the facts are often murky.37 As trite
as it may seem, relying on the burden of proof is the most
overarching and important step toward improving the abil-
ity to recognize or admit you cannot detect a lie. And that is
the honest truth. 
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abuse of discretion as the correct standard for appellate review of
trial-court gatekeeping). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (expanding gatekeeping review to tech-
nical experts in addition to traditional scientific fields).
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Judges who are deciding contested issues in their court-rooms have an immense toolbox of potential methods attheir disposal. Many of these are commonplace methods,
used on a day-to-day basis for common issues in litigation. Pre-
trial conferences come to mind as an example in this regard.
But for those issues involving complex science, a judge has
choices to make on how to perform his or her important gate-
keeping role, and those gatekeeping tools may be more rarely
used. 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court chose to review
admissibility of scientific evidence in the landmark case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.1 In that case, the court
declared that district court judges must act as a gatekeeper for
admissibility of scientific evidence, to determine the relevance
and reliability of expert evidence before its admission. Further
caselaw affirmed and expanded the original Daubert holding,
ensuring trial judges had maximum flexibility to perform the
gatekeeping function.2
So what tools do judges actually use to perform their gate-
keeping role, and how often do they do so? During those years
when the Court was scrutinizing scientific evidence in Daubert
and other related decisions, several studies examined the issue
of gatekeeping methodology in both state and federal courts.
These studies relied on surveys performed before the end of
the Daubert trilogy, at a time when many states had either
recently shifted their standard to Daubert or had yet to do so.
Considering the age of the studies, updated analysis seems
timely. 
In a recent survey, I asked state-court judges about their use
of what I will call “advanced fact-finding techniques.” By this
term, I am referring to those techniques that are often used for
gatekeeping purposes with complex evidence. Specifically, I
wanted to look at the methods contained within the Rules of
Evidence—questions from the bench and independent
experts—which had been endorsed by Justice Breyer for gate-
keeping complex expert evidence.3 Considering this high-level
endorsement of these methods, I reasoned that judges might be
more likely to use them now that Daubert has taken hold. By
surveying judges, I hoped to explain what is actually going on
in courtrooms today.
I intended the survey to answer the following questions:
• Are judges using these techniques?
• If so, how often?
• What specifically are the judges using the techniques to
do? and
• Why are some methods unlikely to be used?
In collecting answers to these questions, the survey could
inform judges whether their use of techniques is typical by
explaining what other judges do in their courtrooms and why.
The results would also be helpful in debating the efficacy of the
current methodologies in the Rules of Evidence and could
raise a policy question of whether modifications are in order.
Finally, the survey touches on how the gatekeeping role—as
envisioned by the Daubert trilogy—may be changing judicial
practice.
This article will discuss these issues in detail by examining
the prior research in the area, explaining the survey design,
and finishing with the survey results and a discussion of their
implications. By asking judges about the methods they use in
their courtrooms, this survey can explore the methodologies of
judging, advanced fact-finding techniques and their use, and
whether the methodologies endorsed by the Supreme Court
match courtroom reality today. 
RESEARCH ON JUDICAL METHODOLGIES SINCE
DAUBERT
In the 1990s debate over “junk science” and judicial man-
agement of complex evidence, scant attention had been paid to
the methodologies of judicial gatekeeping. The Daubert trilogy
clearly established the substantive burden to admit evidence in
federal court, rejecting the Frye general-acceptance test for the
twin inquiries of relevance and reliability from the Federal
Rules of Evidence.4 But the court generally had little to say on
the management of complex science in the courtroom.
In the Joiner decision, Justice Breyer did offer some
thoughts on managing gatekeeping. In his concurrence, Breyer
suggested four different methods for judges to use in the gate-
keeping of expert evidence. Two methods were from the Rules
of Civil Procedure—pretrial conferences and special masters—
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while the other two were from the Rules of Evidence—ques-
tions from the bench and independent experts.5 With barely
more than a paragraph to explain how he proposed judges per-
form the gatekeeping task demanded of them, Breyer and the
Court left it largely to the judges to figure out effective meth-
ods of evaluating expert evidence.
Around the same time as Joiner, several research groups
inquired into the methodology of judicial decision making. In
1998, Carol Krafka and her research team surveyed federal
judges to measure methods used in the courtroom.6 Judges
were asked about their use of a wide variety of techniques,
including independent judicial research, special masters, ques-
tions from the bench, pretrial conferences, and independent
experts. When the survey results were published in 2002, the
researchers had found which techniques were common, which
were uncommon, and which remained unused.
Krafka found that federal judges were very likely to ques-
tion experts from the bench, with 93.6% having used the tech-
nique and only 6.4% stating they did not use that method at
all.7 Compare that result to the use of independent experts and
one can see a stark contrast. A large majority of federal
judges—74%—said they would never consider appointing an
independent expert, with a majority of the remaining 26%
believing it was appropriate only in cases with complex testi-
mony.8 With their study, Krafka and her colleagues recorded
the use patterns of the federal judiciary right at the time of the
Daubert trilogy.
State-court judges would also be surveyed, by Shirley Dob-
bin and her colleagues in 1999.9 In many ways, the state-court
judges had similar responses to the federal judges. For example,
a large majority of judges had questioned an expert from the
bench, with only 18% stating they would not use this method.10
In contrast, state judges appeared more likely than their federal
counterparts to use independent experts, with just 57% stating
they would never use the method and 31% saying they would.11
Of note to this study, the research did not divide the state judges
into groups based on their state admissibility standard.
The combined effect of Krafka’s and Dobbin’s work was to
establish the methodologies of judicial gatekeeping during the
Daubert trilogy. Each study asked judges about the use of spe-
cific methods in their courtroom, showing that the likelihood
of the use of different techniques moving forward varied sig-
nificantly.
You might be thinking, “So with these prior studies, why is
it necessary to survey judges again?” Several reasons necessi-
tated an updated survey of methodologies of judicial gate-
keeping. 
First, the surveys for Krafka’s and Dobbin’s work date to
1998 and 1999. Of course, these were essential in learning
what methods judges used around the time of Joiner. With over
a dozen years having passed since, though, the situation has
changed. At the time of many these surveys, the Daubert tril-
ogy was not yet completed, as Kumho Tire v. Carmichael would
be decided in March 1999.12 Since the Kumho decision
expanded the gatekeeping role to nonscientific technical
expertise, judges might have had to rethink which techniques
they were likely to use after that decision.
Second, at least for many state-court judges, the critical deci-
sion on the substantive standard for judicial gatekeeping was
not Daubert but instead occurred afterward when their state
supreme courts addressed the state standard for admission of
expert evidence. In the years after Daubert, many states fol-
lowed the Supreme Court to a Rule 702 standard.13 Other
states, faced with the same choice, did not.14 Since the issue was
changing rapidly in the 1990s, both on the state and federal
level, the judicial responses from that era may have measured
use of a system that has since changed, or may have asked
judges about gatekeeping methods prior to Daubert taking hold
in judges’ states. Over a decade later, the scientific-admissibility
standard in most states has remained stable for many years,
engendering a stasis lacking in those earlier years.15
Third, recent research suggests judges might be having dif-
ficulty with some of the gatekeeping required under Daubert
and similar state rules.16 If so, establishing the methods that
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are currently being used is critical to understanding if policy
changes are in order. 
Finally, an updated study can measure two things not pre-
viously analyzed in detail. Dobbin’s survey of state-court
judges explained their use of techniques in detail, but the sur-
vey did not examine whether judges’ use of methods changed
based on their “home” scientific-admissibility standard.17 Sec-
ond, neither Krafka nor Dobbin asked judges to explain why
one technique—the use of independent experts—was so
unlikely to be used. In one survey, sent before Daubert,
researchers Joe Cecil and Thomas Willging had asked that
question and found that reluctance to appoint experts was
based on the rarity of cases necessitating an independent
expert.18 Both this finding and the issue of scientific-admissi-
bility standards could be examined in an updated survey.   
STUDY DESIGN
To learn about judicial use of advanced fact-finding
methodologies, I needed both a sample of judges and a survey
questionnaire. 
I began by selecting judges for the survey. To start, I chose
states that would be in a similar geographic area: the Midwest-
ern U.S. I did this to remove, as much as possible, the poten-
tial of cultural or regional differences affecting the results.
Each selected state also needed to have identical or nearly
identical rules for judicial questioning under Rule 614 and
independent experts under Rule 706.
Next, I needed to select states that had variation in their
admissibility standard for expert evidence. This led me to
choose North Dakota, a state that had a Frye admissibility stan-
dard, and Nebraska, which follows Daubert.19 I also decided to
add Iowa as a third survey state, since it has a more state-spe-
cific standard in use.20 Each state met the requirement of hav-
ing nearly identical Rules of Evidence 614 and 706.
Even in those selected states, I also limited the participants to
those judges who serve on the highest level of trial courts in
their state. The selection of these judges ensures not only that
the judge is using the standard state Rules of Evidence but also
that the judge may encounter civil cases of significant complex-
ity, which may require the use of advanced fact-finding methods.
With these parameters, I created a database of eligible trial-
court judges from North Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa. Each
judge in the database received a letter asking him or her to par-
ticipate in the survey, a written survey of ten questions, and a
return envelope. I followed the initial letter with a second
reminder letter several months later. 
In the survey, each judge was asked about three different
methods: judicial questioning of a fact witness using Rule 614,
judicial questioning of an expert witness under Rule 614, and
judicial appointment of an independent expert under Rule
706. For each method, I asked if the judge had used the
method, and if so, how many times. If a judge had used the
method, I asked him or her to explain why, inquiring whether
it was for one or more than one point, and whether it was to
explain something contained in previous testimony or not con-
tained within previous testimony. Then, for all judges, I asked
whether they believed the use of the method would be appro-
priate for either one or more than one point, and whether the
use would be appropriate either to explain something con-
tained in previous testimony or not contained within previous
testimony. After three questions about each of the three meth-
ods, I finished with a final question asking judges to choose
among explanations for why judges are reluctant to appoint
independent experts. Judges could pick more than one answer,
or, if they did not find an explanation they wished to choose,
could also select an open-ended “other” category and then
write a response.21
I sent the survey to the 209 judges who qualified for partic-
ipation, and I received responses from a total of 118 judges, for
a response rate of 56%.22
RESULTS OF THE SURVEY
Having received a terrific response to the survey, my next
step was to analyze the responses of the judges, both collec-
tively and also when grouped into different categories. The
groups included: state of origin, years of experience, gender,
and location of assignment (urban or rural). The categorical
analysis was intended to see if different groups of judges used
the advanced fact-finding methods differently.
RESPONSES OF ALL JUDGES
The first response data I reviewed regarded the general
trends in the use of advanced fact-finding techniques among
all judges. As one might expect, the use of the techniques
declined from the questioning of a fact witness, which was
quite common and frequently used, to the appointment of
independent experts, which was rarely used by most judges.
Rule 614 had been used by 84% of the judges to question a
fact witness, while a majority of 58% had used it to question an
expert. Not only did many judges use Rule 614 to question a
fact witness, but 45% of the judges had done so more than 20
times. While a majority of judges had used Rule 614 to ques-
tion an expert, a much smaller number—12%—had done so
over 20 times. So even among the responses solely on the ques-
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tioning of witnesses, differences can be seen among use pat-
terns depending on the witness. Those numbers sharply con-
trast to the appointment of independent experts under Rule
706. Of all of the judges, only 22% had ever appointed an inde-
pendent expert. Of the 26 judges in the response group who
had done so, only 4 had done so frequently—a rate of 3.4%.
These differences can be seen in Figure 1.
The use patterns between Rule 614 and Rule 706 contrast
not only on the frequency of use but also on the appropriate
reasons for—and personal reasons for—the use of these meth-
ods. When asked for the reasons they had personally used Rule
614 to question a witness, judges could respond that their use
of the method was for either one or more than one point, and
that the use was to clarify either something contained within
previous testimony or not contained in previous testimony.
With these options, the use pattern was nearly identical for
questioning a fact witness and for questioning an expert. 
Judges felt most comfortable with asking questions of a wit-
ness when the questioning was to clarify a discrete point con-
tained within previous testimony. Substantial majorities of
judges who used this technique did so for this reason, with 86%
of judges doing so for fact witnesses and 87% doing so for expert
witnesses. On the other hand, judges were much less comfort-
able with asking witnesses questions to clarify more than one
point about something not contained within previous testimony.
Only 40% of judges using this technique for fact witnesses did
so for this reason, while only 33% did so with experts. The other
two options were in-between—more than one point contained
within previous testimony (62% fact, 70% expert) and one point
not contained within previous testimony (44% fact, 38%
expert). But in large part, the response patterns here were simi-
lar, as seen in Figure 2, and show a general downward trend as
the intrusiveness of the questioning increased.
These responses on the questioning of a witness under Rule
614 contrast with the judicial use of independent experts,
where use of the expert seems to increase along with the intru-
siveness. With the use of Rule 706, a much smaller percentage
of judges appointed an independent expert for the least intru-
sive reason—12%—as did so for the most intrusive reason—
35%. In fact, the two responses with the largest affirmative
answers are the answers about issues unrelated to previous tes-
timony (27% and 35%), and judges seem less comfortable with
using this technique to clarify testimony previously given
(12% and 12%). A visual representation of the response, as
seen in Figure 3, highlights the difference in reasons for judi-
cial use of Rule 706, when compared to Rule 614 and Figure 2.
When the survey asked judges about the appropriate rea-
sons for any judge to use the techniques, instead of about their
personal use of the techniques, similar patterns emerged. For
Rule 614, large majorities agreed with using the technique for
the least intrusive reason—to clarify one point about previous
testimony (88% fact, 81% expert)—while the number declined
substantially when the intrusiveness increased—to clarify
more than one point not contained within previous testimony
(53% fact, 46% expert). But in general, the responses here, as
shown in Figure 4, show general similarities between judicial
use of Rule 614 for fact witnesses and expert witnesses, along
with a general downward trend as intrusiveness increases. 
The judicial responses on appropriate reasons for any judge
to use Rule 706 to appoint an independent expert contrast
sharply with the Rule 614 responses, as they do with the
responses to questions about a judge’s personal reasons for
using the techniques. Judges were again most likely, at 40%, to
agree that it is appropriate to use an independent expert for the
most intrusive reason—to explain more than one point about
previous testimony. The percentage who thought it was appro-
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23. See text accompanying notes 9 & 12. 
24. The age of the prior study in this area, done by Cecil and Willging,
suggested an updated analysis of the issue would be helpful. Cecil
& Willging, supra note 18, at 1004 (surveys given to judges in
1988). 
25. Each of the four options is derived from the prior study in the
area. Cecil & Willging, supra note 18, at 1015-19. Judges were
also instructed that they could choose more than one option, if
they wished to do so.
26. Presumably this is because expert-witness fees under Rule 706 are
often only taxable as expenses at the end of the litigation, while
expert-witness fees are usually due upon receipt. See, e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 706(c)(2). 
27. For this database, the urban locations include: Cedar Rapids, IA;
Davenport, IA; Des Moines, IA; Fargo, ND; Lincoln, NE; and
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA. 
priate did not change a lot from that intrusive reason to the
least intrusive reason—to explain one point about previous
testimony—which 37% agreed was appropriate. Again, a visual
representation of the data, contained in Figure 5, highlights
the difference in responses between judges on their responses
on Rule 706, as compared to Rule 614 and Figure 4.
After asking about Rule 614 and Rule 706, and the fre-
quency and reasons for the use of those techniques, the survey
finished with a question asking the judges why, in general,
judges are reluctant to appoint independent experts. Both
Krafka’s and Dobbin’s work demonstrated that a significant
majority of judges would never consider appointing an inde-
pendent expert,23 and I wanted to figure out why that was the
case.24 The question gave judges four options to explain their
reluctance, and judges could also select “other” and then write
a response.25 The response data for the question are contained
below, in Figure 6.
Most judges—77%—believed that “concern about interfer-
ence with the adversarial system” explained the judicial reluc-
tance to appoint a Rule 706 expert. Similarly, most judges—
69%—disagreed with “lack of knowledge about the procedure”
as an explanation for the lack of 706 appointments. Finally,
slim majorities agreed with “rarity of cases” and “party
experts” as the reasons, at 58% and 52.5%, respectively. And
since so many judges selected the “other” category, it bears
mentioning that many of those judges mentioned cost or pay-
ment of expert expenses as a concern.26
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES BY CATEGORY
Having reviewed the response data of all judges, I also
wanted to analyze the judicial responses by category to see if
different categories of judges used these techniques differently.
First and foremost, I was curious to see if the use patterns of
these fact-finding techniques varied based on the judge’s
home-state scientific-admissibility standard. After all, these are
Daubert gatekeeping methods endorsed by Justice Breyer in
Joiner. But it could also be helpful to see if judges used the
techniques differently in any other category as well. 
To these ends, I split the judges into four categories based
on: state/scientific-admissibility standard, years of experience,
gender, and location of appointment (urban or rural). I divided
the years-of-experience category into two groups of judges, one
group with ten years or less on the bench and one group with
over ten years. For location of appointment, I split judges into
rural and urban groups. Urban judges served at a location that
was the central county of a metropolitan statistical area with a
population over 200,000, based on the 2010 U.S. Census
Data.27 Each categorical subset contained at least 16 judges.
Analysis of the responses demonstrated few differences
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28. The sole exception was a minor difference in responses between
Iowa (state-specific standard) and Nebraska (Daubert) on whether
judges had ever used independent experts. Jurs, supra note 21, at
67 n. 66. 
29. See supra Figure 6. 
30. There is an issue here, though, of the variability of the numbers
due to low sample size. As a result, the difference here—42%—
does not quite meet the threshold for statistical significance. See
Jurs, supra note 21, at 75 n. 76. Clearly, a larger sample size would
clarify if this result is statistically significant or a result of sam-
pling only.
31. Dobbin specifically mentioned the need for further evaluation of
the management practices of state-court judges, now that Daubert
has become so prevalent. Dobbin, supra note 9, at 14.
32. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text. 
33. Cecil & Willging, supra note 18, at 1015-18.
34. Id.
between responses in most categories. While I was curious to
see if the state admissibility standard affected the use of these
techniques, I could find almost no statistically significant dif-
ferences between the judges.28 As a result, I can only conclude
that the judge’s state admissibility standard has little effect on
the use of these fact-finding techniques, whether or not they
were approved for Daubert gatekeeping.
The years-of-experience and gender categories also lacked
many differences in use patterns. For gender, I could find no
statistically significant difference between men and women for
use, frequency of use, or reasons for use of the advanced fact-
finding techniques. For years of experience, most categories of
analysis also yielded no differences. The sole statistically sig-
nificant difference I could find between the more- and less-
experienced judges was on whether they had ever appointed
an independent expert. In the more-experienced group, 29% of
judges had appointed a Rule 706 expert, while only 12.5% of
the less-experienced judges had done so. Considering that a
majority of judges believe independent-expert cases are rare,29
if that is true we would expect to see judges with fewer years
on the bench have fewer opportunities to appoint a 706 expert.
The data do support that result.
Even if the state admissibility standard, the gender, or the
years of experience showed few differences, I could find sev-
eral statistically significant differences between urban and
rural judges. As compared to their urban colleagues, rural
judges gave different responses on the reasons for their own
personal use of—and for the appropriate reasons for any
judge’s use of—Rule 614 to question a fact witness. Rural
judges were more likely to have used Rule 614 to question a
fact witness to “explain more than one point about previous
testimony,” with 69% of judges having done so compared to
45% among their urban counterparts. When asked about rea-
sons any judge might ask questions of a fact witness, 94% of
rural judges thought it was appropriate to “clarify a discrete
point contained within previous testimony,” while only 76% of
urban judges agreed. Both of these differences are statistically
significant. Finally, on the use of Rule 706, there was also a dif-
ference that merits mention. When asked for the reason they
had personally used a Rule 706 expert, 42% of rural judges
said they had done so to “explain more than one point about
previous testimony.” In contrast, there were no urban judges
who had done so for this reason.30
When I analyzed the response data, I found that—for the
most part—judicial use of advanced fact-finding methods does
not vary based on the judges’ characteristics. For gender, years
of experience, and state admissibility standard, this is true with
minor exceptions. The other category—urban and rural
judges—showed variation on several points, with statistically
significant differences between the response groups. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The Midwest judicial survey provides insight into judicial
use of advanced fact-finding techniques in the modern era,
updating and expanding upon previous studies in the area. 
First, the study updates the prior surveys in the area, which
had relied on judicial responses collected no later than 1999.
Krafka’s study of federal judges in the 1990s provided insight
into the case-management practices of federal judges, while
Dobbin’s study did the same with state-court judges. Yet each
relied on surveys administered during the Daubert trilogy,
before the transition of many states to a Daubert gatekeeping
standard, and before the application of Daubert to nonscientific
expertise testimony after Kumho. This survey therefore pro-
vides a much-needed update to the prior work, measuring the
case-management practices of state-court judges now that
Daubert gatekeeping is more firmly established.31
In providing that update, the results obtained are quite sim-
ilar to the prior studies. In Krafka, 74% of federal judges would
not appoint a Rule 706 expert, and in Dobbin, 57% of judges
would not do so. In this survey 78% of judges had never
appointed an independent expert. The results are also similar
on the issue of witness questioning.32 With this survey, we can
see the current patterns for the use of advanced fact-finding
techniques and can observe that they have not changed drasti-
cally since the 1990s. 
Second, the survey provides the only data since Daubert on
why judges are reluctant to appoint independent experts. In a
1988 survey, Cecil and Willging asked judges why they were
reluctant to appoint Rule 706 experts.33 In their work, a major-
ity of judges (62%) responded that the rarity of appropriate
cases explained that reluctance, while less than half (48%)
agreed it was the adversarial system.34 The response data from
this survey contrast with these prior results. A large majority
of judges in this survey (77%) felt it was adversarial norms that
explained reluctance to appoint, while a much smaller major-
ity (58%) selected rarity of cases. These results show a clear
difference in responses to explain judicial reluctance to
appoint Rule 706 experts, suggesting further study is war-
ranted to further understand the issue. In addition, if judges
believe—as this survey suggests—that adversarial norms
explain reluctance of judges to use Rule 706, it suggests the
rule will remain largely unused. Policymakers might wish to
decide if having a “moot” rule is appropriate, or if changes
should be made to reinvigorate or otherwise modify the rule. 
Next, in analyzing the data, we can learn several lessons
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35. Supra text accompanying note 28. 36. See, e.g., Krafka, supra note 6, at 322; Gatowski, supra note 16, at
443.
about judicial management of complex evidence using these
techniques. The survey responses demonstrate an inverse rela-
tionship between likelihood of the use of Rule 614 and the
intrusiveness of the reasons for use, so that as the questions
become more intrusive, judges are less likely to personally use
the rule and are less likely to believe it is appropriate for other
judges to do so. Yet for Rule 706, the pattern is different.
Judges are more likely to have personally used an independent
expert for the most intrusive inquiries, namely, those about
more than one point not contained within previous testimony.
The same is true for judges’ opinions about appropriate reason
for other judges to appoint a 706 expert. These responses
demonstrate different use patterns for the two different tech-
niques measured.
Another interesting result from analyzing the data is the
relationship between a state’s expert-admissibility standard and
a judge’s use of these techniques. These techniques, after all,
were specifically endorsed for Daubert gatekeeping by Justice
Breyer in Joiner. Yet when we examine judicial use of these
Daubert techniques, we see that the use of the methodologies
is basically the same between judges with a home-state stan-
dard of Daubert and those with other standards.35 The data
therefore affirm a finding from earlier studies: that the power
of Daubert was not in the way specific issues are handled, but
rather in the system-wide increase in scrutiny of scientific or
other expert evidence.36
Finally, when the responses were broken into different cat-
egories, the responses of urban and rural judges demonstrated
the most differences. I am not aware of any similar findings in
other studies, and I see this as a new finding warranting fur-
ther research. The question of the nature of judging in urban
and rural areas, and the differences between those areas, is one
that would be quite interesting and could have significant pol-
icy implications as well.
By measuring the actual practices of state-court judges, this
study provides insight into what is actually occurring in the
courtroom today, how judges perform their assigned duties,
and whether those methods are as useful as the Supreme Court
had suggested. 
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Official judicial-performance evaluation (JPE) programsin the United States emerged to achieve importantjudicial-branch objectives. JPE programs respond to
the need for courts to demonstrate accountability, provide
information for voters in low-information judicial-retention
elections, improve the quality of the bench by providing feed-
back for individual judges to use for self-evaluation purposes,
and assist judicial administrators in making decisions on
retention and assignments in some states with appointed judi-
ciaries. A number of professional organizations, such as the
American Bar Association, American Judicature Society, and
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal Sys-
tem, are strong advocates for the value of JPE programs.1
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia currently oper-
ate official JPE programs, mostly conducted by the judicial
branch itself, but some conducted by executive-branch agen-
cies in a few states.2 Whether official or unofficial, nearly all
JPE programs rely upon surveys distributed to attorneys and
court staff—and in some instances to jurors, litigants, and oth-
ers—as the exclusive or a primary method for measuring judi-
cial performance.3 Most state JPE programs are based on the
American Bar Association’s Black Letter Guidelines for the
Evaluation of Judicial Performance,4 and several states use
some variation of the model surveys put forth by the ABA
Lawyers’ Conference.5
The great potential of JPE programs to improve the qual-
ity of justice is not being realized due to fundamental prob-
lems in the evaluation methodologies they use. Some of these
problems result from deficiencies in basic survey design or in
the manner in which the surveys are distributed, issues we
have previously addressed.6 Other problems result from the
failure to incorporate efforts to minimize the potential for
systematic biases against women and minority judges in JPE
survey ratings. 
The good news is that if states adopt best practices in sur-
vey design generally and work-performance surveys in partic-
ular, it is possible to improve the validity of JPE surveys and
minimize the presence of bias in evaluation ratings. This arti-
cle briefly explains the potential for bias in JPE surveys and
then describes one effort to design a new JPE survey that
achieves the above goals. 
CONCERNS OF BIAS IN SURVEY-BASED JUDICIAL-
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Anecdotally, concerns about the problem of gender and
racial bias in results of state JPE surveys have been voiced for
decades.7 Unfortunately, very little research has been con-
ducted on the efficacy of state JPE survey instruments.8 It was
not until 2011, when researchers at the University of Nevada
published evidence of systematic gender and racial biases in
the JPE ratings data from one state,9 that this issue gained
momentum. Other research confirms that in JPE surveys based
Improving Judicial-
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on the ABA model,10 women and minority judges receive sys-
tematically poorer ratings on average relative to their male and
majority group peers.11
Although critics have recently targeted the ABA model as a
biased approach to performance evaluation,12 stereotypic bias
is likely present in the rating results of JPE surveys developed
independently from this model. Gender and racial biases have
been observed in both informal performance appraisal and for-
mal work-performance evaluations across a number of job
types and fields. When rating others’ work performance, eval-
uators often draw on assumptions about race, ethnicity, gen-
der, and other social or cultural stereotypes to construct their
judgments. An evaluator may or may not be consciously aware
of doing this. This cognitive phenomenon, known to some in
the court community as implicit bias, has been found to pro-
duce systematically different judgments about candidates with
identical qualifications or about employees with comparable
performance to the systematic disadvantage of women and
racial minorities subjected to evaluation. 
Stereotypic bias is also likely to be present in the ratings
from all JPE surveys because of how these surveys are devel-
oped. Many modern approaches to survey design improve the
overall quality of survey data in part by reducing the likelihood
or the impact of an array of undesirable response biases,
including, in some cases, stereotypic gender and racial biases.13
Most state JPE surveys do not reflect scientific advances in the
understanding of quality survey design.14 This is perhaps to be
expected because most were designed a decade or more ago,
generally by groups of legal practitioners with limited guid-
ance, if any, from researchers with professional expertise in
survey design.15
Efforts to incorporate modern techniques in survey design
can help to minimize the impact of stereotypic biases on data
and, more generally, can improve the overall quality of data
collected by JPE surveys.16 In this article, we draw on the expe-
rience of the first state to redesign its JPE surveys following the
new research findings about systematic bias in JPE results. 
IMPROVING SURVEY-BASED JUDICIAL-PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION: A CASE EXAMPLE
In 2010, a Supreme Court of Illinois sought assistance from
the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) in developing
and implementing a new survey for use in their mandatory
statewide JPE program. In this program, all judges are required
to undergo evaluation for the purpose of judicial education
and self-improvement. When
selected, judges are asked to
nominate attorneys and court
personnel to complete their
evaluations. They also meet
with a facilitator or mentor
judge at the end of the process
to discuss individual results
and to help create an action
plan for professional develop-
ment. Given the structure and
goals of this program, the over-
seeing state Supreme Court committee prioritized the confi-
dentiality of performance-evaluation results to encourage an
open, honest atmosphere for feedback. They stressed the
importance of confidentiality both for respondents providing
feedback and for judges in terms of their individual results.
Individual JPE results are not retained on file for any adminis-
trative purpose, nor are they shared with anyone but the judge
and his or her facilitator. 
Within this framework, NCSC attempted to develop a new
survey for this state JPE program that improved upon contem-
porary JPE survey practices. NCSC sought to do so, in partic-
ular, in ways designed to minimize the likelihood that the tool
would produce systematically biased results as observed in
other state JPE programs. In particular, we describe efforts
undertaken to develop a new JPE survey instrument for use
with attorney respondents. The new JPE survey instrument for
statewide use emerged from the following multi-step process.
Critical review. NCSC staff conducted a review of 22 JPE
surveys of attorneys to identify key judicial-performance crite-
ria. This sample included four model surveys put forth by var-
ious organizations and a number of surveys recently or cur-
rently used by state JPE programs.17 Informed by this review of
existing survey instruments, NCSC staff then assembled a pre-
liminary list of modified survey items that represented the cri-
teria identified by the Illinois legal community as critical to
judicial performance. Survey-design considerations at this
stage emphasized basic item and response-scale clarity and
correspondence, which many contemporary JPE surveys
lacked. To reduce biased responding, NCSC focused particu-
larly on developing items that described more concretely the
kinds of judicial behaviors that an attorney or court staff would
actually have the opportunity to directly observe. Similarly,
questions that asked respondents to make generalized attribu-
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18. See e.g., Bauer & Baltes, supra note 3, and Baltes et al., supra note
3.
19. See DON A. DILLMAN, JOLENE D. SMYTH & LEAH MELANI CHRISTIAN,
INTERNET, MAIL, AND MIXED-MODE SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN
METHOD (3d ed. 2008).
20. The Illinois surveys routinely achieve response rates in the range
of 55-70%, with approximately 55-60% of attorneys and approxi-
mately 60-70% of court personnel completing the JPE surveys in
full. The use of reminder notifications was associated with an
increase in response rates of 25 percentage points. Note also that
respondents who preferred to complete a hard copy of the survey
were provided with this alternative to participate. 
21. Roger Tourangeau, Cognitive Science and Survey Methods: A Cogni-
tive Perspective, in COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF SURVEY METHODOLOGY:
BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN DISCIPLINES (Thomas B. Jabine, Miron
L. Straf, Judith M. Tanur & Roger Tourangeau eds., 1984); and
Gordon B. Willis, Cognitive Interviewing: A “How To” Guide
(1999), available at http://appliedresearch.cancer.gov/areas/cogni-
tive/interview.pdf.
tions about the judge’s perfor-
mance or conjecture about the
judge’s personality were recast
into more concrete, behavioral
terms or eliminated from consid-
eration. 
Supreme Court committee
oversight. The state Judicial Per-
formance Evaluation committee consisting of judges and attor-
ney members reviewed preliminary drafts of the survey instru-
ment and provided recommendations for revision of content.
These reviews helped to ensure that survey items captured the
key elements of judicial performance as defined in Illinois. Com-
mittee feedback included comments on the evaluation criteria
represented in the survey items and the language or legal termi-
nology used. This committee also reviewed and commented on
several subsequent drafts of the instrument as it was refined in
the following steps. 
We wish to note here that other states seeking to develop a
new JPE program may also benefit from conducting separate
focus groups of judges and of each potential respondent group
(e.g., attorneys, court personnel). Focus groups, when con-
ducted by independent research groups using trained, profes-
sional facilitators, can yield rich information and honest, con-
structive input about the types of information judges are most
interested in learning and that they would find most helpful,
and about the types of observations that respondents feel they
ought to be able to communicate in a constructive evaluation
of judicial performance. Through this approach, stakeholder
concerns may be addressed at an early stage of program devel-
opment. These outreach efforts may also help to promote the
upcoming program and generate support. By engaging stake-
holders in the development process, judges, attorneys, and
others involved can develop a sense of ownership over the pro-
gram, leading to greater satisfaction with the final product.
This may be important for some types of JPE programs more
than others (e.g., for those designed for the purpose of profes-
sional development or voter education). 
Consultation with survey design and work-performance
evaluation experts. NCSC staff also consulted with academic
experts on performance evaluation and survey design to further
improve evaluation accuracy and minimize the opportunity for
systematic biases based on gender, race, or ethnicity to influ-
ence evaluation responses. The draft survey was refined based
on feedback from this panel of experts to include more concrete
language in the description of survey items. A structured free-
recall task, in which survey respondents are prompted to recall
specific instances of the judge’s actual courtroom behavior
immediately before completing the judge’s performance evalua-
tion, was also adopted based on expert recommendations.
Research shows that this type of task facilitates retrieval of
information about past observed behavior for use in the formu-
lation of performance-evaluation judgments, reducing reliance
on social schemas (e.g., stereotypes). This helps to produce less
systematically biased and more accurate evaluations.18
Testing. Following these steps and in preparation for full-
scale launch of the JPE survey, NCSC staff created the survey
in a web-based environment using the Confirmit software plat-
form with methodology that comported with Dillman’s scien-
tific tailored design method for internet surveys.19 This
approach includes a research-informed procedure for schedul-
ing and issuing tailored notifications according to the respon-
dent’s status (i.e., if the survey is complete, incomplete, or not
yet started). Notifications designed for the Illinois JPE survey
include a prenotice in which the respondent is notified of his
or her selection for participation before the evaluation period,
an invitation at the beginning of the evaluation period, and up
to three tailored reminder notices, which may be issued to the
respondent until he or she participates in the evaluation or
until the evaluation period concludes. 20
After the JPE survey tool was developed in the web-based
environment, NCSC staff conducted a careful internal test to
ensure that the mechanics of the internet survey and corre-
sponding distribution processes operated as intended. After
passing this internal test of general functionality, the survey
was subjected to external testing with samples of eligible
respondents. External testing is a critical step before full-scale
implementation that can help establish instrument validity and
determine whether efforts to minimize or eliminate systematic
biases in results were successful. In Illinois, two external tests
were conducted.
First, NCSC staff contracted with a local research agency to
evaluate the JPE survey by conducting cognitive interviews with
three licensed Illinois attorneys. In this cognitive-interview
approach, attorneys completed the online evaluation form in the
presence of interviewers who were trained to assess problems
with survey items, instructions, and functionality in this context
based on Tourangeau’s cognitive-interviewing model.21 Inter-
viewers asked attorneys probing questions about their thought
processes and reactions as they completed the survey to deter-
mine which components, if any, presented barriers to participa-
tion. This included probes to identify components that lacked
clarity, did not use appropriate legal terminology, were unneces-
sarily long or tedious, or posed other challenges to respondents.
These trained interviewers identified user concerns regarding
the clarity of some instructions (e.g., the explanation of the con-
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22. The Illinois survey has not been published in final form, but a
draft version was included as an appendix to Knowlton & Red-
dick, supra note 11.
23. Bauer & Baltes, supra note 3; and Baltes et al., supra note 3.
24. The Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts does not track
gender or racial demographic information for judges statewide.
Researchers could determine gender based on the name of the
evaluated judge, but racial background could not be readily iden-
tified. Thus researchers could not evaluate Year 1 results from the
new JPE survey to determine whether systematic racial bias was
present. However, authors expect results from an analysis for
racial bias to be similar to the results of the gender analysis
because of the similar psychological mechanisms underlying
biased responding.
25. Cf., Burger, supra note 11; Gill, supra note 11; Gill et al., supra
note 9.
fidentiality policy), the user-friendliness of some components of
survey navigation, and the clarity of some survey items. 
In addition to cognitive-interview testing, NCSC staff con-
ducted a pilot study of the JPE survey to vet the JPE survey
instrument and procedure. A small sample of judges volun-
teered to participate in this pilot study, which produced com-
plete survey data from a sample of approximately 100 eligible
attorney respondents. These pilot study respondents were also
asked to complete an optional follow-up questionnaire
designed to elicit feedback about respondent perceptions of and
experience with the online JPE survey tool. Based on statistical
analysis of this JPE survey pilot data, user feedback from the
follow-up questionnaire, and results from the cognitive inter-
views, instructions were refined and streamlined, and problem-
atic items were revised or removed to improve overall clarity,
user-friendliness, reliability, and validity of the JPE survey. 
The new evaluation instrument that emerged from this
multi-step development process contained 59 rating questions
and five optional narrative comment fields across the following
five areas of judicial performance: legal and reasoning ability,
impartiality, professionalism, communication skills, and man-
agement skills.22 The instrument met psychometric standards
and adhered to best practices in survey design and perfor-
mance evaluation, with a particular focus on minimizing the
potential for an array of respondent biases (including stereo-
typic biases). NCSC staff also adopted procedures to enhance
data quality control within the framework of the existing state
JPE program. First, respondents were assigned individual
logins to access the JPE survey; respondents could therefore
complete an evaluation of a single judge only once within a
single evaluation period. Respondents were also prompted to
base their evaluations on their own recent, direct experience
working with the judge in a workplace environment, and not
on the judge’s reputation or on personal or social contact with
the judge. By incorporating the structured free-recall task dis-
cussed above23 into the web-based JPE survey, respondents
were explicitly prompted to recall their direct experiences
working with the judge before completing the judge’s evalua-
tion. With these efforts, authors hoped to facilitate respondent
use of more reliable sources of information about each judge’s
performance in the evaluation process. 
The present study illustrates one potential approach to the
development of a fairer JPE survey tool. An analysis of the first
full year of data produced by the Illinois survey revealed that JPE
results did not systematically differ by the judge’s gender.24 This
demonstrates that a JPE survey can be developed that both com-
ports with the conceptual underpinnings of the influential ABA
model and produces results without marked gender disparities,
as has been found in the results of JPE surveys done elsewhere.25
While we recommend a rigorous development process like
the one used in Illinois, the sur-
vey that emerged from that
development process should not
be unquestioningly adopted by
other states. Several important
features of the state context for
JPE should be carefully consid-
ered when approaching survey
redesign or the development of a
new tool, including the
expressed purpose of the JPE
program (e.g., to inform the indi-
vidual judge’s professional devel-
opment, to inform the assignment and/or retention decisions
of the judiciary, to inform the public) and the state’s distinctive
legal and judicial culture. A need may arise to develop separate
JPE surveys to evaluate judges presiding over different case
types or dockets. For example, a few states have already devel-
oped separate survey-evaluation processes for use with judges
presiding in high-volume and low-volume courts. The real
challenge for the future, however, is to develop multi-method
JPE programs that call upon a diverse set of data-collection
strategies to maximize evaluation accuracy and utility.
BEYOND SURVEY-BASED MEASURES
Taken together, recent empirical findings support a policy
recommendation that calls for the validation and likely revi-
sion of survey instruments employed by JPE programs, and for
additional guidance on multi-method approaches to the mea-
surement of judicial performance. To date, the over-reliance on
surveys has been a significant a problem because the weak-
nesses of surveys are not compensated for by the strengths of
alternative measurement methodologies. A future program of
research should explore how other methodologies may help to
enhance the quality of JPE programs and improve the ability to
achieve expressed JPE goals. 
The quest for a better, multi-method program of JPE is a
complicated one. Commonly recognized objective measures of
judicial performance tend to emphasize productivity over
quality. More subjective forms of evaluation like survey rat-
ings, narrative feedback, and courtroom observation tend to be
relied upon to capture performance quality. It should be recog-
nized that all subjective forms of evaluation are capable of pro-
ducing biased results if they are not designed well, as has been
observed with survey-based measures. Greater structure is
likely needed to establish a sound process for evaluators. These
forms of JPE should also be subjected to scientific scrutiny
before they are adopted to ensure that they produce fair, high-
quality evaluation data. 
Efforts to revitalize and improve JPE programs are already
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NETHERLANDS AND SPAIN (Giuseppe Di Federico ed., 2005).
27. For information about the workshop, visit http://goo.gl/tmlaT.
26. RECRUITMENT, PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION AND CAREER OF JUDGES AND
PROSECUTORS IN EUROPE: AUSTRIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, THE
underway. Several other states have followed Illinois’s lead and
are overhauling JPE programs that have been in place for 10
years or more. The international scene also holds potential as
we look for other approaches to evaluating judges. Most West-
ern European countries have JPE programs in place, some with
decades of experience.26 To promote an international dialogue
on JPE, the National Center for State Courts and the Academy
of the Social Sciences in Australia co-organized a Workshop on
Evaluating Judicial Performance, bringing together an interna-
tional group of 22 judges, law professors, and social scientists.
The workshop, held May 9-10, 2013, at the International Insti-
tute for the Sociology of Law in Oñati, Spain, identified issues
that can be regarded as generic to the task of evaluating judges,
along with the key differences associated with distinctive court
structures, legal systems, and, most importantly, recruitment to
the bench.27
CONCLUSION
Judicial-performance evaluation programs can be of great
benefit to the state courts. They can help to address core con-
cerns, such as the need to be accountable in ways consistent
with judicial independence and to allow judges the opportu-
nity to hone their skills on the bench. The potential contribu-
tions of JPE programs remain, but considerable work is needed
to bring JPE surveys up to the standard of best practices and to
balance the results of those surveys against other well-devel-
oped approaches to performance evaluation. Although some
states already have programs that are multi-method (augment-
ing surveys with interviews, case-processing data, and other
measures), the problem of bias will need to be tackled. With
states working to improve their JPE programs and interna-
tional attention growing in this area, it is likely that JPE pro-
grams of the future will look very different than they do today. 
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rate than several other judges on the same court. This article
addresses whether perception matches reality. Several studies
have examined perceptions of judges and courts by surveying
the public about its confidence in a particular court.1 Our
study differs because it compares perceptions of individual jus-
tices with their actual voting patterns.
Incomplete samples are one source of distorted claims about
judicial behavior. Excluding a particular group of outcomes,
such as unanimous decisions, can lead to questionable results.2
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assignment.9 Some studies of judiciaries, run at the behest of
special-interest groups, seem to have little interest in present-
ing a balanced picture of judicial behavior.10
Are perceptions of judicial performance accurate if the sam-
ple used to assess judges’ behavior is complete, no screening of
cases is present, random assignment is used or nonrandom
assignment features are accounted for, and an interest group is
not trying to shape perceptions? This article uses such a sam-
ple to compare actual judicial performance with perceptions of
judicial behavior, as reflected in 2,106 responses to a survey of
166 actors in the Israeli legal community. To gauge actual judi-
cial performance, we use two full years (2006 and 2007) of
criminal cases decided by the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC). The
sample consists of 1,410 mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases
and 48 discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases. We compare
justices’ actual behavior in criminal cases to survey respon-
dents’ rankings of those justices. The results suggest little asso-
ciation between the reality of judicial performance in the mass
of cases and perceptions of that performance by the legal com-
munity. Because actual performance in the mass of criminal
cases is not associated with perceived performance, we explore
alternative sources of perceptions: media reports, votes in dis-
cretionary-jurisdiction cases, and differences among surveyed
respondent groups.
Although our study is limited to one country, the results sug-
gest caution in concluding that judges favor one group or the
other—one possible definition of bias. The limited association
between perception and reality suggests that claims of bias
should be based on careful analysis of judges’ actual behavior,
rather than on either casual observation or only a few cases.
This article first provides background information about the
Israeli judiciary. It then presents survey results regarding the
Israeli legal community’s perceptions of 16 ISC justices’ ten-
dencies in criminal cases. The survey asked respondents the
degree to which they believe individual justices are favorable to
the state or to defendants. We then compare the survey results
with justices’ actual voting patterns in criminal cases. The arti-
cle explores the differences between perceptions and reality.
THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY11
Israel is a unitary state with a single system of traditional
courts of general jurisdiction, as well as other tribunals or
authorities with judicial power that have jurisdiction limited
by subject matter or persons covered. Within the traditional
courts, the judiciary law establishes three levels of courts: the
ISC, district courts, and magistrate courts.12 District courts and
magistrate courts are trial courts; the ISC functions as both an
appellate court and as the High Court of Justice (HCJ). In its
HCJ capacity, the ISC operates as a court of first and last
instance, primarily in areas relating to government behavior.
Because the ISC’s HCJ function is not as an appellate court, this
study excludes those cases. The study does consider HCJ infor-
mation relating to workload (in contrast to HCJ outcomes)
because the HCJ workload can affect justices’ assignments to
appellate cases.
The basic trial courts are the 29 magistrate courts. Magis-
trate courts serve the locality and district in which they sit, and
they generally have criminal jurisdiction over offenses with a
potential punishment of up to seven years of imprisonment.
They have civil jurisdiction in matters involving up to a spec-
ified monetary amount—currently 2.5 million shekels
(approximately U.S. $690,000)—as well as over the use, pos-
session, and division of real property. Magistrate courts also
serve as traffic courts, municipal courts, family courts, and
small-claims courts. A single judge usually presides in each
case unless the president of the magistrate court directs a panel
of three judges to hear the case.13
Six local district courts have residual jurisdiction in any
matter that is not within the sole jurisdiction of another
court.14 As courts of first instance, district courts exercise juris-
diction over criminal cases punishable by more than seven
years’ imprisonment. District courts’ civil jurisdiction extends
to matters in which more than 2.5 million shekels are in dis-
pute. District courts also serve as administrative courts and
hear cases that deal with, inter alia, companies and partner-
ships, arbitrations, prisoners’ petitions, and appeals on tax
matters. These courts have appellate jurisdiction over magis-
trate court judgments.15
The ISC has jurisdiction to hear criminal and civil appeals
from judgments of the district courts. Cases that begin in a dis-
trict court are appealable, as of right, to the ISC. Other matters,
particularly the mass of cases that begin in the magistrate
courts, may be appealed only with the Court’s permission. The
ISC’s decisions are binding on lower courts, and Israel adheres
to the principle of stare decisis.16 The ISC generally sits in pan-
els comprising three justices. The president or the deputy pres-
ident of the Court may expand the size of the panel to any
uneven number of justices, but that happened so rarely during
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(Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36 LSI 35, §§ 146-47 (1981-
1982) (Isr.).
23. CA 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or 36(3) PD 123 (1982) (Isr.).
24. See Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 702 n.48.
25. See DC 4927/92 State of Israel v. Ben Yehuda (unpublished opin-
ion) (1992) (Isr.).
26. CrimA 1245/93 Shtarkman v. State of Israel 47(2) PD 177 (1993)
(Isr.).
27. DC 3251/91 Yishai v. State of Israel PD 45(5) 441 (1991) (Isr.).
Prior work questions adherence to the Chenion Haifa standards.
Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 720.
28. Criminal Procedure Rules, 5734-1974, § 44(7) (Isr.).
29. Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36
LSI 35, § 205 (1981-1982) (Isr.).
30. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7.
31. The survey appears as an appendix to Theodore Eisenberg, Talia
Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Actual Versus Perceived Performance of
Judges, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 615 (2012).
the two years examined in this study that it did not require fur-
ther consideration.17
Courts sitting on appeal, whether district courts or the ISC,
are formally authorized to adjudicate issues of both fact and
law, but they seldom intervene in factual matters and tend to
limit their judgment to questions of law.18 The underlying ratio-
nale is that on appeal, judges usually are not directly exposed to
witnesses and other types of evidence. This does not negate the
ability of the appellate court to examine whether the factual
basis for the decision of the lower court is anchored on sound
evidentiary foundations, but the de facto appeal practice is not
one of de novo review.19 Our study focuses primarily on manda-
tory criminal appeals, which are regulated in a slightly different
manner than civil appeals under Israeli law. We describe only
the criminal appeals process here and refer the reader to our
description of civil appeals elsewhere.20
In criminal cases, a verdict issued by the district court sit-
ting in the first instance can be appealed to the ISC as a matter
of right.21 A verdict issued by the magistrate court in the first
instance can be appealed to the district court as a matter of
right. In Israel, both prosecution and defense have symmetri-
cal rights of appeal, as the prosecution is authorized to appeal
a defendant’s acquittal.  When a case is initiated in the magis-
trate court and appealed to the district court, both the prose-
cution and the defense can petition the ISC for a second appel-
late review.22
The requirements governing discretionary ISC appellate
review laid down in Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or,23 the most
cited precedent in Israeli caselaw,24 apply to criminal and civil
cases.25 Chenion Haifa states that the ISC should grant discre-
tionary review only when significant legal or public issues are
at stake that transcend the interests of the litigating parties.
Such legal or public issues may include, for example, conflict-
ing rulings by lower courts or matters of constitutional signif-
icance. Under this standard, the lower-court result should not
affect the decision to grant a discretionary appeal. Therefore,
according to the standard of review, a defendant’s argument
concerning the stigmatizing effect of conviction26 or even the
severity of punishment are not grounds for a second appellate
review.27
A single justice usually reviews a request for discretionary
appeal, but a panel of three justices can also review the
request.28 When a three-justice panel reviews the request, the
panel is authorized to treat the request as an actual appeal and
can decide the case on its merits.29 As discussed previously,
discretionary appeals are usually based on a preliminary
screening by a single justice, a process we explore elsewhere.30
PERCEPTIONS OF ISC JUSTICES
Methodology
We used an online survey to ask members of the Israeli legal
community their opinions of the degree to which individual
justices favored the state or defendants in criminal cases. The
survey’s first part asked respondents to rate each justice based
on the respondent’s view of the justice’s pro-prosecution or
pro-defendant tendencies. The second part asked respondents
about their position in the Israeli legal community.31 In an ini-
tial survey of the Israeli legal community in September and
October 2011 and in a follow-up survey limited to law stu-
dents in November 2011, recipients were invited to participate
through an email containing a hyperlink to an online survey
site. The invitations were sent to the following: (1) faculty
members of all university and college law schools in Israel; (2)
all alumni of Tel Aviv University Law Faculty; (3) approxi-
mately 150 current law students at Tel Aviv University belong-
ing to the classes of 2012 through 2014, as well as advanced-
degree students; (4) all public defenders in Israel; (5) many
prominent law firms operating in Israel; (6) a select group of
prestigious criminal lawyers; and (7) the Attorney General’s
office. We lacked direct access to public prosecutors; therefore,
we requested that the Attorney General’s office assist us in
internally distributing the survey. It is unclear whether the sur-
vey was distributed, and we suspect that it was not. The few
responses we received from public prosecutors were probably
due to their parallel affiliations (such as Tel Aviv University
alumni). The online software allowed a recipient to provide
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somewhat below the nominally neutral response of three on
the survey’s five-point scale. Given that the ISC affirmed over
80% of the mandatory criminal appeals,33 it is understandable
why the respondents regarded justices as being somewhat
favorable to the state. Indeed, only the state attorneys’
responses averaged above three, and their mean of 3.03 barely
exceeds that number.
Figure 1 shows the mean response for each justice, desig-
nated by the filled circles, and a measure of the uncertainty in
the responses.  The uncertainty measure consists of the upper
and lower 95% confidence intervals, indicated by the lines
emanating from the circles. The mean responses are taken from
the justice means in Table 1. The x-axis depicts the justices,
with the justice perceived as most favorable to the state appear-
ing closest to the origin and the justice perceived as most
favorable to defendants included as the last justice on the x-
axis. Thus, Justice Arbel was perceived as most favorable to the
state and Justice Elon was perceived as least favorable. The
confidence intervals suggest that statistically significant differ-
ences exist for several pairs of justices. For example, no over-
lap in confidence intervals exists for Justice Arbel and any jus-
tice other than Justice Berliner. Only two justices have lower
95% confidence intervals that exclude three, but several jus-
tices have upper 95% confidence intervals that exclude three. 
The groups with presumably greater experience and infor-
mation about ISC activity perceived the court differently. Table
1 shows that perceptions of criminal attorneys and public
defenders did not substantially differ in their means. The data
also indicate that defense lawyers divide the justices into three
groups, with five justices (Arbel, Berliner, Beinisch, Naor, and
Levy) perceived as substantially pro-state, four justices (Rubin-
32. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11.
33. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11. Affirmance rates of
about 80% in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases are not
unusual. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dis-
sent, and Variability in State Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Juris-
dictional Source, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1479 tbl.4 (2009) (showing
such rates in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases resolved by
U.S. state supreme courts).
only one response per justice. 
The survey asked respondents to “rank each justice accord-
ing to your view of their pro prosecution or pro defendant
views” on a five-point scale, which was coded as follows:
Very pro prosecution: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Somewhat pro prosecution: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Neither pro prosecution nor pro defendant: . . . . . . . . 3
Somewhat pro defendant: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Very pro defendant: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Respondents could reply that they had “no opinion” about
a justice. The survey included all 16 ISC justices who served in
2006 to 2007. 
The survey’s second part asked respondents to self-identify
with one of the following groups (each group’s number of
respondents is in parentheses): (a) private practitioner with an
emphasis on civil law (civil attorneys) (23); (b) private practi-
tioner with an emphasis on criminal law (criminal attorneys)
(16); (c) law professor (23); (d) state attorney (6); (e) public
defender (16); (f) law student (73); and (g) other (9). For
some purposes, we combined the criminal attorneys and pub-
lic defenders into a single group labeled “defense lawyers.” We
aggregated these groups because they represent criminal defen-
dants and might be expected to have similar views of justices. 
The results of our earlier work—used in the analysis
below—describe the actual pattern of justices’ votes32 and were
not made publicly available until the survey period closed. The
surveys yielded 2,656 responses pertaining to individual jus-
tices provided by 166 respondents. We removed the “no opin-
ion” responses from the analysis, resulting in 2,106 responses.
The “Total” column in Table 1 shows the responses for each
justice less the “no opinion” responses, which ranged from a
high of 158 for Justice Barak to a low of 94 for Justice Berliner.
The “Total” row in Table 1 shows the number of responses
from each respondent group without the “no opinion”
responses. When appropriate, our analysis accounts for the
nonindependence of observations by the same respondent.
Due to the sampling process, we cannot be sure that the
respondents are a random draw from the Israeli legal commu-
nity, and our findings are subject to this limitation. Although
we solicited a broad range of respondents, we could not ensure
responses to our invitations.
Survey Results
Table 1 and Figure 1 report the pattern of results by justice
and respondent group. The first row of Table 1 shows the mean
responses of the respondent groups for each justice on the five-
point scale described previously. The second row shows the
number of respondents with respect to that justice. For exam-
ple, the first two rows of the “Civil Attorneys” column show
that civil attorneys had a mean response of 1.91 based on 23
respondents with respect to Justice Arbel.
The overall mean of the 2,106 responses was 2.70, which is
FIGURE 1. 
MEANS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICES
ALL RESPONDENTS
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Note: The figure shows the results of a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of
2011 that asked about the respondents’ perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-
defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-
state. The y-axis shows the mean response for each justice across all survey respondents.
The lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for each justice. Justices are ordered
along in x-axis in ascending order of pro-defendant perception.
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stein, Kheshin, Melcer, and Elon) perceived as moderately pro-
defendant, and the remaining seven justices perceived as being
between the other two groups.
The few state-attorney responses produced imprecise esti-
mates. Nevertheless, a noticeable difference was their generally
more pro-defendant perception of the ISC. Table 1 shows that
their mean perception score was 3.03, which makes them the
only group that regarded the justices as pro-defendant on our
scale. Nine justices had mean perception scores of three or
more, so the pro-defendant average of state attorneys was not
a consequence of extreme views of one or two justices. Within
this generally more pro-defendant perception, state attorneys
shared with defense lawyers the relative perceptions of Justices
Arbel, Berliner, and Levy as being pro-state. Thus, the two
groups with direct litigation experience—defense lawyers and
state attorneys—while representing clients with opposing
interests, shared a view of Justice Levy as being relatively pro-
state. Law professors had the opposite perception of him. In
TABLE 1. PERCEIVED PROPENSITY OF VOTING FOR DEFENDANT OR STATE, 
BY JUSTICE AND RESPONDENT GROUP
JUSTICE CIVIL 
ATTORNEYS
CRIMINAL
ATTORNEYS
LAW
PROFESSORS
LAW
STUDENTS
PUBLIC
DEFENDERS
STATE
ATTORNEYS
OTHER TOTAL
Arbel 1.91 1.40 1.53 2.34 1.63 2.17 2.25 1.98
23 15 19 59 16 6 8 146
Barak 2.76 2.25 2.29 3.04 2.63 3.40 3.13 2.80
21 16 21 71 16 5 8 158
Beinisch 2.09 1.56 1.68 2.88 1.88 2.83 2.57 2.35
22 16 22 67 16 6 7 156
Berliner 2.00 2.20 2.21 3.00 1.15 2.50 2.80 2.28
18 15 14 25 13 4 5 94
Elon 3.50 3.25 3.79 3.06 3.57 3.75 3.40 3.33
16 12 14 49 14 4 5 114
Fogelman 2.83 2.85 2.43 3.11 2.46 3.00 3.00 2.83
18 13 14 27 13 5 8 98
Grunis 2.53 2.56 2.47 2.78 2.79 2.75 3.00 2.69
19 16 19 59 14 4 7 138
Hayut 2.57 2.29 2.29 2.89 2.73 3.00 3.00 2.69
21 14 17 55 15 5 7 134
Joubran 3.10 2.73 2.50 3.20 3.00 2.60 2.71 2.99
20 15 18 64 15 5 7 144
Kheshin, D 3.07 2.90 2.67 2.72 3.38 3.25 2.75 2.87
14 10 12 53 13 4 4 110
Levy 2.22 1.53 3.05 2.76 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.47
23 15 19 54 15 6 7 139
Melcer 2.94 3.83 3.29 2.94 3.31 3.80 3.67 3.20
16 12 14 48 16 5 6 117
Naor 2.05 1.79 2.16 2.75 1.81 2.80 2.71 2.37
22 14 19 63 16 5 7 146
Procaccia 2.64 2.33 2.50 3.20 2.20 3.50 3.13 2.83
22 15 18 61 15 4 8 143
Rivlin 2.60 3.00 2.76 3.07 2.58 4.00 3.13 2.95
15 16 17 54 12 4 8 126
Rubinstein 2.95 3.20 2.25 2.64 3.19 3.67 2.50 2.79
22 15 20 56 16 6 8 143
Total 2.57 2.44 2.44 2.89 2.51 3.03 2.91 2.70
312 229 277 865 235 78 110 2106
Note: The table shows the results of a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of 2011 that asked about the respondents’ perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or 
pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state.
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34. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7; Eisenberg, Fisher &
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11; Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra
note 20, at 709.
35. We tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the database by
comparing it with data obtained from the ISC’s secretariat. This
comparison suggested that the IJA website data are indeed com-
prehensive, covering the full gamut of cases. The website does not
include cases decided in camera. But since those cases are an
insubstantial fraction of the cases decided by the Court, the omis-
sion does not materially affect the analysis here. See Courts Law
(Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271, § 70(a) (1983-
1984) (Isr.).
36. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7.
37. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11, at 283 tbl.18.
38. The state is more successful both in cases appealed by defendants
and in cases appealed by the state. Id.
39. Id. at 279 tbl.17.
contrast, the state attorneys’ perception of Justice Joubran was
closer to the perception of law professors than it was to the per-
ception of defense lawyers. Defense lawyers regarded Justice
Joubran as relatively pro-defendant, whereas law professors and
state attorneys regarded him as more pro-state.
A consistent result across all groups was the pro-state per-
ception of Justice Arbel. She was perceived as the most pro-state
justice, or one of the most pro-state justices, by all groups. Jus-
tices Elon and Melcer were consistently regarded as pro-defen-
dant, and a substantial group of justices was perceived as
between the two extremes by all groups.  Regression models,
not reported here, confirm the pattern in Table 1. All justices
were perceived to be more pro-defendant than Justice Arbel,
and that those differences were statistically significant. 
We defer possible explanations of the survey results until
after we report the justices’ actual votes.
ISC JUSTICES’ ACTUAL PERFORMANCES COMPARED
TO PERCEPTIONS
To compare perceptions with justices’ actual voting behavior,
we used the justices’ votes in cases. We used data employed in
earlier studies of ISC appellate cases, which included discus-
sions of the data’s limitations.34 We describe here relevant
aspects of the data.
The case outcomes with which we compare perceptions are
mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases
decided by the ISC in the years 2006 and 2007. The study
includes every ISC substantive opinion available online via the
official Israel Judicial Authority (IJA) website for cases decided
during that time period. Since the IJA website contains all of the
cases decided by the ISC,35 the resulting database provides a
complete picture of ISC doctrinal decisional activity.
The cases identified by the above methods were coded by
student research assistants. Before the student coding, the
authors designed a data form to structure the coding. After
review of the performance of the form and the students in an
initial set of cases, the form was revised and a final form con-
structed. The students used that revised form to code the cases
under our supervision.
The outcome variable is each justice’s vote in each case.
“Vote for defendant” is a dummy variable recording the direc-
tion of each justice’s vote. A justice’s vote favored the state if a
justice voted to affirm a decision on an appeal brought by a
defendant or reverse a decision on an appeal brought by the
state. A vote favored the defendant if it was a vote to affirm a
decision on an appeal brought by the state or to reverse a deci-
sion on an appeal brought by the defendant. A justice’s vote
could differ from the case’s outcome if a justice dissented, which
rarely occurred in the ISC in the time period studied.36 We
excluded about 4.5% of votes in mandatory-jurisdiction crim-
inal cases because they involved votes that we did not charac-
terize as favoring the defendant or the state, such as “approved
in part and denied in part.”
Table 2, based on our earlier work,37 reports each justice’s
votes for mandatory and discretionary cases. It also shows the
number of each type of case (mandatory or discretionary) the
justices voted in and each justice’s rank, as measured by the
justice’s rate of voting for defendants. The dominant pattern
was that the state was more successful than criminal defen-
dants.38 The lowest rate at which any justice voted in favor of
the state was 72%, as shown in the first numerical column. The
range of pro-defendant vote percentages was broader in discre-
tionary cases, but these percentages were based on far fewer
cases than the mandatory-case percentages. The ISC grants
review in a small fraction of discretionary cases.
Regression analysis in our earlier work controlled for non-
random aspects of case assignment—case-category specializa-
tion, workload, and seniority—as well as for the most serious
crime present in a case, and the gender of defendants.39 It con-
firmed that Table 2’s mandatory-case columns provided a rea-
sonable ordering of justices’ tendencies to vote for the state or
defendants. By exploiting the use of random case assignment
and controlling for nonrandom aspects of case assignment, the
methodology accounted for the varying merits of cases pre-
FIGURE 2. 
RELATION BETWEEN SURVEY RESPONSES AND
PRO-DEFENDANT VOTE RATE
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Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and justices’ votes in manda-
tory-jurisdiction criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the Israeli
legal community shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents’ perceptions of ISC
justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five,
with one being the most pro-state. The rates at which justices voted for the state’s posi-
tion in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases were based on cases decided by the ISC in
the years 2006 and 2007.
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40. Justices Levy and Berliner were perhaps the justices with the best
match of perceptions of their voting tendency and their actual vot-
ing patterns. They were both perceived as being relatively pro-
state, and both voted in favor of the state more than most other
justices. Conversely, Justice Rivlin was perceived as fourth most
favorable to defendants, yet his voting pattern tended to be more
pro-state. A substantial number of justices were perceived as being
neither very pro-state nor very pro-defendant, and their voting
patterns reflected that neutrality.
sented to justices. Differences in justices’ rates of voting for the
two parties are thus reasonably attributable to justices, not to
case characteristics. 
How do the perceptions compare with the justices’ perfor-
mances as reflected in Table 2? We first compare performance
in mandatory-jurisdiction cases with survey scores. We then
compare performance in discretionary-jurisdiction cases with
survey scores.
Survey Scores and Mandatory-Jurisdiction Case Performance
Figure 2 shows the relation between survey scores and jus-
tices’ votes in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. The data points in
Figure 2, indicated by justices’ names, represent each justice’s
rate of voting for defendants, as shown on the x-axis, and that
justice’s mean survey score, as shown on the y-axis. For exam-
ple, Justice Naor voted for defendants in 27.8% of her cases,
the highest rate of any justice. Her mean survey score, as
shown in Table 1, was 2.37, well below the overall survey
mean. Her combination of votes and survey scores is therefore
represented by her location in the lower-right portion of Fig-
ure 2. If survey perceptions reflected justices’ observed rates of
voting for defendants, then the data points should flow from
lower left to upper right. That is, a justice with a relatively high
rate of voting for defendants who is also perceived as being rel-
atively pro-defendant should be located in the upper-right por-
tion of the figure. A justice with a relatively low rate of voting
for defendants who is also perceived as being relatively pro-
state should be located in the lower-left portion of the figure.
The figure shows an unexpected pattern. The data flow, if
anything, from upper left to lower right. A simple correlation
coefficient was negative but insignificant (-.27; p = .307), sug-
gesting little association between perceptions and voting pat-
terns. Justices perceived as pro-defendant tended to vote for the
state. Perceptions of Justice Naor were relatively pro-state, but
her voting pattern was most favorable to defendants. Justices
Elon and Melcer show the opposite combination: perceived to
be pro-defendant but with low rates of voting for defendants.
Justice Fogelman, who had the most pro-state voting pattern,
was perceived to be relatively neutral. No justice who was per-
ceived as being relatively pro-defendant (Justices Elon, Melcer,
Joubran, and Rivlin) actually tended to vote for defendants.40
Justice Arbel’s position was distinctive. As Table 1 and Figure 1
show, she was the justice perceived to be the most pro-state. Yet
she was average in her rate of pro-state votes.  We conclude that
TABLE 2. RATE AND RANK OF JUSTICES’ VOTING FOR STATE BY JURISDICTIONAL SOURCE
MANDATORY CASES DISCRETIONARY CASES JUSTICE’S 
MANDATORY CASE
RANK
JUSTICE’S 
DISCRETIONARY
CASE RANKJUSTICE Rate favoring 
defendant
N Rate favoring 
defendant
N
Fogelman .12 168 1.00 4 2 13
Elon .13 167 .80 5 2 4
Melcer .13 86 1.00 3 2 13
Levy .14 829 .87 23 4 12
Rivlin .14 142 .80 5 4 4
Arbel .15 351 .82 17 6 8
Berliner .15 274 .60 5 6 2
Joubran .16 446 .80 20 8 4
Rubinstein .16 434 .85 20 8 10
Beinisch .17 150 .57 7 10 1
Kheshin, D. .17 195 .80 5 10 4
Procaccia .19 138 .85 13 12 10
Grunis .20 169 1.00 5 13 13
Hayut .21 215 .83 6 14 9
Barak .23 43 1.00 1 15 13
Naor .28 154 .60 5 16 2
Note: The table shows the rate at which each justice voted for the state’s position in mandatory and discretionary criminal cases. A vote favored the state if it was to affirm an appeal
brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote favored the defendant if it was to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by
the defendant. The last two columns show the ordinal rank of each justice for mandatory and discretionary cases. The ordinal rank is based on the rate at which justices voted for the
state in criminal cases, with a lower rank corresponding to voting more often for the state. The cases are mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases decided by the ISC
in the years 2006 and 2007.
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41. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11, at 283. 
42. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 720.
43. A similar effect may be at work for Justice Beinisch. She served as
the State Attorney of Israel from 1989 to 1995. Figure 2 indicates
that perceptions of her do not match well with the rate at which
she voted for defendants in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. She was
the most pro-state justice in discretionary-jurisdiction cases, but
that is based on only seven decisions. The pro-state view of her
may stem from her prior position. 
From 1972 to 1979, Justice Naor served as Deputy State Attor-
ney in the Ministry of Justice. She is also regarded as relatively
pro-state. Other justices have also served the government in high
legal offices. Justice Barak served as Israel’s Attorney General from
1975 to 1978, and Justice Rubinstein served as Attorney General
from 1997 to 2004. Neither is perceived as very pro-state. There
may be a difference between the way the public perceives former
Attorneys General (less pro-state) compared to how the public
perceives former state attorneys (more pro-state). Attorneys Gen-
eral have often publicly defied the government by refusing to rep-
resent the state when they thought the state was in the wrong.
State attorneys, on the other hand, are not in a position to defy the
state, and they are in charge of all the criminal trials.
44. Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Con-
strual: “Naïve Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405 (1995).
justices’ actual voting patterns in mandatory criminal cases
contribute nothing whatsoever to explaining perceptions of jus-
tices as being pro-state or pro-defendant.
Survey Scores and Discretionary-Jurisdiction Case 
Performance
We previously noted justices’ significantly different voting
patterns in mandatory and discretionary cases.41 Discretionary
cases, for which basic statistics are reported in Table 2 above,
therefore provide a second possible basis for explaining the
survey-scores pattern. Figure 3 shows the relation between
survey scores and justices’ performance in discretionary cases.
The data points are again indicated by justices’ names, with
justices’ rates of voting for defendants (now in discretionary
cases) shown on the x-axis and their mean survey scores
shown on the y-axis. The expected pattern of data flow from
lower left to upper right is recognizable, though imperfect. A
justice with a relatively high rate of voting for defendants was
generally perceived as being relatively pro-defendant.
A simple correlation coefficient was positive and nearly sig-
nificant (.47; p = .065), suggesting a reasonably strong associ-
ation between perceptions of justices as pro-state or pro-defen-
dant and how justices voted in discretionary-jurisdiction cases.
If one excludes the most outlying point in the figure, Justice
Arbel (discussed below), the coefficient was .56 and significant
at p = .029. However imperfect an association Figure 3 por-
trays, it is much closer than Figure 2’s mandatory-case pattern
in exhibiting the expected relation between survey scores and
voting patterns.
RECONCILING PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY
The above results suggest two differing relations between
perceptions and reality—a positive association between jus-
tices’ votes in discretionary-jurisdiction cases and a negative,
insignificant association in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. This
Part explores that difference, as well as intergroup differences
among survey respondents. It also adds a second possible
source of influence regarding perceptions of justices’ perfor-
mances: coverage in the media.
Differences Based on Jurisdictional Source and Group 
Affiliation
It is plausible that justices’ votes in discretionary cases
would better explain survey scores than votes in mandatory
cases. Justices are supposed to grant review in discretionary
cases based on each case’s importance. Though this principle is
often not honored,42 if a case’s importance plays some role in
discretionary-case selection, then the average discretionary
case is likely more important than the average mandatory case.
Thus, it is reasonable that a more important class of cases
would play a greater role than mandatory cases in shaping the
public’s perceptions of judicial voting tendencies. Yet, the
Court reviews so few discretionary cases compared to manda-
tory cases—about 3% the number of mandatory cases—that it
is puzzling that discretionary cases influence the legal com-
munity’s perception so heavily.
Another factor is likely to help explain the influence of dis-
cretionary cases. Attorneys and law students do not read and
code all cases heard by the Court, and they are probably
unaware of the patterns we report in mandatory cases. Manda-
tory cases therefore cannot be a basis for their perceptions, and
discretionary cases may shape perceptions by default.
Even in discretionary cases, however, the perception and
reality for Justice Arbel do not match. She is perceived as the
most pro-state justice, which is not supported by her voting in
either mandatory or discretionary cases. For many justices, the
small number of discretionary cases they hear makes those
cases an imprecise measure of the justices’ behavior. But Jus-
tice Arbel has the fourth highest number of discretionary-case
participations (17), and Table 2 shows that she ranks as the
eighth most favorable justice for defendants (as well as the
sixth most favorable in mandatory cases). Thus, the legal com-
munity’s perception of her has no basis in these voting pat-
terns. Justice Arbel served for several years (1996–2004) as the
State Attorney of Israel and thus head of the State Attorney
Office, which represents the state in court. Perceptions of Jus-
tice Arbel may be influenced more by her relatively recent
association with the state than by her actual performance in
criminal cases.43
Some of the perception patterns may be explained not only
by the justices’ behavior but also by the survey respondents’
characteristics. Table 1 shows law professors to have a rela-
tively pro-state view of justices and state attorneys to have a
relatively pro-defendant view of justices. We noted above that
state attorneys differ significantly from both criminal lawyers
and from public defenders.
The significant differences between the state attorneys and
the defense lawyers may represent what psychology
researchers call “naïve realism.”44 “[P]eople do not fully appre-
ciate the subjective status of their own construals, and, as
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such, they do not make sufficient allowance for the uncertain-
ties of construal when called on to make behavioral attribu-
tions and predictions about others.”45 A similar effect has been
reported in an experiment that assigns participants roles as
defense lawyers or prosecutors.46 If lawyers tend to identify
with their clients’ positions beyond the objective merits of
their cases, then both state attorneys and defense lawyers may
not fully appreciate the subjective status of their own views in
shaping their perceptions of ISC justices. Their inflated per-
ception of the merits of their clients’ positions translates into
an altered view of how the justices treat their clients. Defense
lawyers think the justices are more out of line with their
clients’ innocence or deserved lower sentences, and therefore,
they tend to perceive justices as relatively pro-state. State attor-
neys think the justices are more out of line with the state’s view
of guilt or deserved higher sentences and therefore tend to per-
ceive justices as relatively pro-defendant. Evidence exists that
lawyers, like other people, also misperceive their own perfor-
mance and behavior.47
Perceptions and Media Coverage
Perceptions of legal performance can be shaped by media
coverage,48 so media characterizations of justices may influ-
ence perceptions of them. To explore this influence, we sur-
veyed newspaper coverage of the 16 justices appearing in the
questionnaire. The newspaper survey included all articles in
two leading Israeli newspapers49—Yediot Aharonot (Ynet) and
Ma’ariv (NRG)—that are available online. These articles
should reasonably reflect media coverage because the vast
majority of articles published in the last decade in these cen-
tral newspapers are available online. Our sample includes only
articles relating to the criminal-case decisions of each of the
justices, thereby excluding all references relating to other judi-
cial activities (especially in the constitutional realm). In order
not to skew the results, we did not double count similar arti-
cles that appeared in both newspapers. The time period
included in the online survey was from 2003 through most of
2011. Table 3 shows the percentage of newspaper articles that
reported pro-defendant tendencies out of the total pool of ref-
erences to each of the justices.50
As with the justices’ votes in mandatory and discretionary
cases, the question arises whether survey responses were asso-
ciated with media reporting. Figure 4 shows the relation
between justices’ survey scores and the percentage of media
45. Id. at 404.
46. ANDREAS GLÖCKNER & CHRISTOPH ENGEL, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR
RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS, ROLE INDUCED BIAS IN COURT: AN
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS (2012), available at
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_37online.pdf.
47. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bank-
ruptcy Cases, 272 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 980, 988 (1994) (finding,
for example, that 32% of lawyers report that they never request
court-ordered compensation in excess of normal hourly rates, but
judges report that only 11% of lawyers never make such requests);
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1504 (1998) (noting that “there is sugges-
tive evidence that self-serving bias does affect lawyers and judges
as well as other actors”); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
135, 150 (1993) (finding self-serving interpretation of fairness in
study that included law students).
48. E.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW:
POLITICS, THE MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS ch. 5 (2004). As
claimed by Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit, “Not only is the media
the main source of knowledge about law for the public at large,
but it is also an important resource for legal professionals and
members of the political elites as well.” Bryna Bogoch & Yifat
Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High
Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 53, 54 (2008).
49. According to the 2010 TGI Research survey, Yediot Aharonot and
Ma’ariv jointly enjoyed an exposure rate of 47.5% for all individ-
uals above the age of 18. The biannual TGI survey measures news-
paper readership among other topics. See Hagai Kraus, TGI Sur-
vey: Israel Today Increases the Gap, WALLA (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://b.walla.co.il/?w=//1781680.
50. In addition to articles about the justices’ general criminal-case
decisions, special attention was focused on the press coverage of
the  high-profile case of former Israel President Moshe Katzav,
who was convicted of rape and other charges in December 2010.
Isabel Kershner, Israeli Court Upholds Rape Conviction of Ex-Presi-
dent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at A8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/world/middleeast/israels-
supreme-court-upholds-rape-conviction-of-ex-president.html.
ISC consideration of his appeal began on August 7, 2011, by Jus-
tices Arbel, Joubran, and Naor. The  justices in the Katzav case
received wide media coverage during the time our survey was
conducted. Discussion in the media about the justices began
when the panel was selected; thus, much of the coverage occurred
before our survey. The defendant’s conviction was upheld by the
ISC panel on November 10, 2011. This media coverage included
op-eds and profile articles that depicted both Justices Arbel and
Naor as exhibiting strong pro-state tendencies, while Justice
Joubran was overall portrayed as less pro-state. This may have
affected the public perception with respect to these particular jus-
tices.
FIGURE 3. 
RELATION BETWEEN SURVEY RESPONSES AND PRO-DEFENDANT VOTE RATE
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Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and justices’ votes in discre-
tionary-jurisdiction criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the
Israeli legal community shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents’ perceptions
of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one
to five, with one being the most pro-state. The rates at which justices voted for the state’s
position in discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases were based on cases decided by the
ISC in the years 2006 and 2007.
154 Court Review - Volume 49 
51. Characterization of justices in the media may be associated with
an ISC institutional feature we explore elsewhere, justices’ votes
in cases in which they write the Court’s opinion. Theodore Eisen-
berg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rozen-Zvi, Group Decision Making on
Appellate Panels: Presiding Justice and Opinion Justice Influence in
the Israel Supreme Court, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. (forthcom-
ing Aug. 2013).
stories portraying a justice as pro-defendant. The correlation
coefficient was positive and nearly significant (.48; p = .059),
suggesting a reasonable association between media coverage
and perceptions. This result is similar to, but slightly stronger
than, the association between survey scores and discretionary-
case outcomes. If one excludes the most outlying justice in the
figure, Justice Naor, the correlation coefficient was .61 and sig-
nificant at p = .017. So both discretionary-case votes and media
reports were associated with perceptions of justices to a much
greater degree than mandatory-case votes.51 Discretionary-case
outcomes and media reports were not linearly correlated (coef-
ficient = .13; p = .633).
Media coverage is most helpful in explaining perceptions of
Justice Arbel. Her votes in both mandatory- and discretionary-
jurisdiction cases are not consistent with the perception of her
as the most pro-state justice. She was mentioned in more arti-
cles than all but one of the justices in our media survey. Those
articles, as shown in Table 3, may be the reason for the pro-
state perception. Although Justice Elon was referred to in fewer
articles, the pattern of his media coverage may help explain the
perception of him as pro-defendant despite his voting pattern
in mandatory cases, which tended to favor the state.
The precision of the media-coverage survey score and dis-
cretionary-case survey score relations are subject to the limita-
tion of small numbers of observations. Table 3 shows few
newspaper stories for several justices, and Table 2 shows few
discretionary cases for several justices. Nevertheless, the avail-
able evidence is that both media coverage and discretionary-
case voting patterns better explain perceptions of justices than
do voting patterns in the mass of criminal cases, which are
reviewed under mandatory jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the gap between perception of judges’ voting
activity and how they actually vote is important to fairly eval-
uate judges. We have presented evidence that a small number
of discretionary cases and media reports shape perceptions
more than the mass of mandatory-jurisdiction cases. The per-
ception that a judge is biased toward the state or the defendant
can be inconsistent with the judge’s voting pattern in the mass
of cases, as our data show for some ISC justices. As we demon-
strated, Justice Arbel is perceived as the most pro-state justice
with no basis for that perception in her voting record. Justice
Naor is perceived as pro-state but in fact voted for defendants
more than any other justice in mandatory-jurisdiction cases.
Justices Elon and Melcer are perceived as pro-defendant with
no basis for that in their voting pattern in mandatory-jurisdic-
tion cases. Suggestions or innuendo that these justices are
FIGURE 4.
RELATION BETWEEN SURVEY RESPONSES AND MEDIA COVERAGE
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Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and media reporting about
ISC justices in criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the Israeli
legal community shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents’ perceptions of ISC
justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five,
with one being the most pro-state. Newspaper coverage was based on the media results
reported in Table 3.
TABLE 3. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF ISC JUSTICES’ 
CRIMINAL DECISIONS, 2003-2011
MANDATORY 
CASES
DISCRETIONARY
CASES
JUSTICE NUMBER OF 
ARTICLES
NUMBER OF 
PRO-DEFENDANT
PERCENT OF 
PRO-DEFENDANT
Arbel 17 1 5.9
Barak 5 1 20.0
Beinisch 7 1 14.3
Berliner 16 2 12.5
Elon 6 4 66.7
Fogelman 4 2 50.0
Grunis 16 12 75.0
Hayut 9 2 22.2
Joubran 12 5 41.6
Kheshin, D. 5 3 60.0
Levy 1 1 6.3
Melcer 4 1 25.0
Naor 3 3 60.0
Procaccia 18 3 16.7
Rivlin 6 3 50.0
Rubinstein 7 2 28.6
Note: The table shows the rate at which each justice voted for the state’s position in
mandatory and discretionary criminal cases. A vote favored the state if it was to affirm
an appeal brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote
favored the defendant if it was to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an
appeal brought by the defendant. The cases are mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdic-
tion criminal cases decided by the ISC in the years 2006 and 2007.
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biased in favor of one party or the other in criminal cases
might be demonstrably unfair.
Perceptions may be shaped by factors we cannot assess here,
such as the dominance of a few cases that are regarded as
important. Such cases surely influence the public’s perceptions.
But the full evaluation of a justice should include his or her
behavior in the mass of cases as well as in the few. In the non-
Israeli context, few studies thoroughly and objectively assess
judicial behavior in a manner that would support claims of
bias. Studies tend to lack full samples of judges’ cases due to
limitations of available opinions or nonpublic votes to grant
review. Our Israel-based study demonstrates that such limita-
tions can distort perceptions of judicial performance.
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• Creating a self-help center
• Establishing a statewide self-help hotline
• Facilitating discussion among judges about how to provide unbundled legal representation
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$219 single/double
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Dates and Hotel TBD
Seattle, Washington
Sheraton Seattle
October 4-7
$189 single/double
THE AJA ANNUAL CONFERENCE:  THE BEST JUDICIAL EDUCATION AVAILABLE ANYWHERE
For more information, go to http://goo.gl/SklRK.
Co
u
rte
sy
o
fL
a
s
Ve
ga
s
N
e
w
s
Bu
re
a
u
2014 Annual Conference 2015 Annual Conference
Alaska Court System
Adopts Fairness Pledge
http://goo.gl/qHArx
Under the leadership of Chief Justice
Dana Fabe, the Alaska judiciary has
posted a new fairness pledge in court-
houses throughout the state. Fabe
announced the pledge in her January
State of the Judiciary address to the
Alaska Legislature. She began by dis-
cussing the public’s expectation of fair-
ness in court, and she continued by con-
trasting a typical courthouse with a typi-
cal hospital:
[I]f you go into a hospital lobby,
you will often notice a sign contain-
ing a clear statement of your rights as
a patient: that you are entitled to be
treated with dignity and respect and
to have your questions answered.
Alaskans who come to court should
have the same assurances. So today, I
announce a pledge to each litigant,
defendant, victim, witness, juror, or
other person who is involved in a
court proceeding: The judge and
court staff will listen to you, treat you
with respect, and respond to your
questions. We will post this pledge in
every courthouse in the state.
It may seem simple and obvious,
but it is our belief that this pledge of
fairness, consistently offered and
openly displayed, will go a long way
to remind everyone in our court-
houses that ensuring fairness is an
active process, for which there are no
short cuts. Courtrooms must be
places that foster understanding and
respect for our laws, for the people
affected by them, and for the judges
who endeavor to uphold them. They
must be places that help bring a
sense of clarity, community connec-
tion, and confidence that justice will
be served. It is within this spirit that
we reaffirm to the people of Alaska
that listening, respecting, and
explaining are the hallmarks of what
justice requires.
The Internet link shown above will
take you to a column by Chief Justice
Fabe providing additional background
about the fairness pledge, which has been
placed in each of Alaska’s 44 courthouses.
The pledge is printed in English as well
as six other languages.  
Trends in State Courts 2013
http://www.ncsc.org/trends
Each year, the National Center for
State Courts publishes a book with short
pieces by court leaders on trends in the
state courts. The 2013 edition was
recently published—and is available at
this website along with the past editions
from 2000 forward.
Topics covered in this year’s print edi-
tion include:
• Improving child-protection outcomes
• Using courthouse-observation teams
to improve service
• Identifying access-to-justice issues for
the poor
• Addressing human trafficking in the
courts
• Integrating procedural-fairness princi-
ples into a domestic-violence docket
• Exploring steps that have been taken
in New Mexico to improve alternative
dispute resolution.
In addition to the print version of this
publication you’ll also find a new online
monthly edition of Trends, including mul-
timedia clips from authors to highlight
and expand on their written pieces. 
23rd National College on
Judicial Conduct and Ethics
October 23-25, 2013
Chicago, Illinois
http://www.ajs.org
Nothing is more important to main-
taining public confidence in the judiciary
than making sure that judges comport
themselves with integrity. Yet judicial-
ethics programming is usually inter-
spersed into a lengthy set of educational
programs for judges and may not get the
attention it deserves.
Most judges can benefit from a more
intensive review of judicial-ethics rules
and current issues in judicial ethics and
discipline. Toward that end, the American
Judicature Society sponsors its annual
National College on Judicial Conduct and
Ethics—and the 23rd annual conference
will be held October 23-25 in Chicago. 
The gathering provides a forum for
judges, staff of judicial-conduct commis-
sions, judicial-ethics-advisory commit-
tees, and others to discuss the ethics rules
for judges, with a focus on the areas that
cause specific problems. Sessions at this
year’s conference will include:
• Social media and judicial ethics
• Off-bench conduct
• Pro se litigants
• Drawing the line on judicial demeanor
• Judicial disqualification
Registration fees for the conference are
$350 through August 23 ($375 there-
after). 
The Resource Page
g
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PLEDGE OF FAIRNESSThe fundamental mission of the Alaska Court System is to provide a fair and impartial forum for the resolution of disputes according to the rule of law. Fairness includes the opportunity to be heard, the chance to have the court process explained, and the right to be treated with respect.   The judges and staff of the Alaska Court System therefore make the following pledge to each litigant, defendant, victim, witness, juror, and person involved in a court proceeding:    
We will LISTEN to you
•
We will respond to your QUESTIONS about court procedure
•
We will treat you with RESPECT
